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Enlargement is one of the EU’s most powerful policy tools.
The pull of the EU has helped transform Central and
Eastern Europe from communist regimes to modern,
well-functioning democracies. . . . It is vitally important for
the EU to ensure a carefully managed enlargement process
that extends peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human
rights and the rule of law across Europe.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
From the founding days of the European Coal and Steel
Community (“ECSC”) in 1952, European integration has been
designed as an open access model. At least in principle, every
European State has the right to join.2 And in spite of the
2. According to Article 98 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of
April 18, 1951, “Any European State may request to accede to [the Coal and Steel
Community].” Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 98,
Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. The European Economic
Community Treaty of March 25, 1957, was even more explicit. See Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty
of Rome]. In its Preamble the founders are “calling upon the other peoples of Europe
who share their ideal to join.” Id. The latter passage has survived numerous treaty
changes and re-organizations and can still be found in the Preamble of the currently
applicable Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at
49 [hereinafter TFEU]. The concept of “Europe,” as something more than a
geographic term is nicely developed in ALLAN F. TATHAM, ENLARGEMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 203–05 (2009). The Commission itself has confirmed that:
The term “European” has not been officially defined. It combines
geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the
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somewhat mixed reviews the European Union (EU)3 has been
getting from its citizens over the years,4 it has shown a
remarkable and sustained attractiveness to those not yet among
its members.5 The main reason is, undoubtedly, that the EU has
been successful in its primary mission, namely to bring peace
and prosperity6 to a continent that was regularly torn apart by
violent conflict ever since historic records exist. At first, only
Western Europe was able to benefit but right when the impact of
European integration on peace and prosperity in the region was
beginning to be taken for granted, the challenge of expanding
the mission to all of Europe presented itself. As we all know, the
EU has meanwhile grown from 6 Western founding members to
28 current members and now encompasses virtually the entire
European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and
historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is
subject to review by each succeeding generation. The Commission believes that it is
neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European
Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come.
Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, 3 E.C. BULL., no. 92, at 11 (1992)
(emphasis added). The concept of European identity is elaborated on by Tatham. See
TATHAM, supra, at 477–90.
3. Although “European Union” only replaced “European Community” or
“European Communities” with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, or TEU,
on November 1, 1993, for the most part the present article shall use European Union
and the abbreviation EU indiscriminately.
4. Since 1973, Eurobarometer has polled thousands of citizens in all Member
States as well as certain candidate countries several times per year to compile a
representative picture of public opinion on European integration as such, various
questions related to the EU and its institutions, as well as a number of issues of current
interest. The results are available online at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
index_en.htm. For an early analysis, see generally KARLHEINZ REIF & RONALD
INGLEHART, EUROBAROMETER: THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION (1991).
For more recent discussion see, for example, Danilo Di Mauro & Marta Fraile, Who
Wants More? Attitudes Towards EU Enlargement in Time of Crisis – General Attitudes Towards
Enlargement 2007-2011 (EUDO Spotlight 2012/04, Oct. 2012), available at http://
www.eui.eu/projects/eudo/documents/2012/spotlight4.pdf; Robert C. Luskin, James
S. Fishkin, Stephen Boucher & Henri Monceau, Considered Opinions on Further EU
Enlargement: Evidence from an EU-Wide Deliberative Poll (Stanford working paper series,
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Toronto, ONT, Canada, Sept. 3–6, 2009), available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/
research/papers/2008/EU-enlargement.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Europe’s Magnetic Attraction, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2001, at 3.
6. Peace and prosperity remains a core theme in the development of the EU. See
2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 1; see also Communication from the Commission,
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, at 2, COM (2006) 649 final (Nov. 8,
2006) [hereinafter 2006 Enlargement Strategy].
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geographic range of Europe. One additional country managed
to sneak in through the backdoor without a formal accession
procedure.7 Only two countries, Norway8 and Switzerland,9 have
ever decided against accession, and only one territory,
Greenland,10 has ever decided to leave the EU.11 No fewer than
7. By ratifying the 1990 Unification Treaty between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic (Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der
Einheit Deutschlands – Einigungsvertrag), East Germany accepted the extension of the
application of the West German Basic Law and, as a consequence, the entire West
German legal order, to its territory and its citizens pursuant to Article 23 of the Basic
Law. Since this procedure did not create a new state but an incorporation of East into
West Germany, the united Germany retained its international rights and obligations,
including the membership in the EU. Although Germany thus grew by about 16
million inhabitants, its voting power in the Council of Ministers and the number of
seats in the European Parliament were not adjusted because, from the perspective of
the EU, there had not been a formal accession of a new member state. The simplified
incorporation procedure under Article 23 was repealed with the ratification of the
Unification Treaty. Thus, there will not be another stealth accession to the EU by
“other parts of Germany,” such as the Kaliningrad area. For the Basic Law in force
before 1990, see Documents – Founding of Two States: The Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic, GHDI, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_
document.cfm?document_id=2858 (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). For background reading,
see TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, IN EUROPE’S NAME: GERMANY AND THE DIVIDED CONTINENT
343–77 (1993); TATHAM, supra note 2, at 47–56.
8. Indeed, the Norwegians voted twice against accession, first in 1972 (by 53.5%),
and again in 1994 (by 52.2%). For more information on Norway, see generally
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NORWAY AND THE EU: PARTNERS FOR
EUROPE (2009), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/eu/
Norway%20and%20the%20EU.pdf. Specifically for a discussion of the two NO votes,
see Kate Hansen Bundt, Why the Norwegians Said No, in EURO-SKEPTICISM: A READER 113
(Ronald Tiersky ed., 2001).
9. To be precise, the Swiss did not vote against EU membership when they
rejected the European Economic Area (“EEA”) on December 6, 1992, but de facto, by
rejecting the lesser alternative to full membership, they made it impossible for their
government to pursue an application it had already submitted. For background
information on Switzerland, see Frank Emmert, Switzerland and the EU: Partners, for
Better or for Worse, 3 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 367, 367–98 (1998); for a more recent
analysis see Christine Kaddous, Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Europäischen Union und der
Schweiz, in 1 ENZYKLOPÄDIE DES EUROPARECHTS (Armin Hatje & Peter-Christian
Müller-Graff eds., 2014).
10. Greenland became a member of the EU in 1973 as part of Denmark. The
population of Greenland had voted against joining in 1973 but was overruled by the
majority of all of Denmark. After gaining a larger measure of autonomy in 1979,
Greenland held another referendum and decided to leave the EU, which finally
happened in 1985. For analysis, see Phedon Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the European
Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MAASTRICHT J. 209 (2013). Algeria is another special case.
Since it was considered an integral part of France when the Treaties of Paris and Rome,
infra notes 18–19, entered into force, Algeria became part of the EU with France, albeit
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eight more countries are right now at various stages of accession
preparation,12 and several more may yet decide to apply.13 Thus,

with limitations as per Article 227 EEC-Treaty. Upon gaining independence in
1962—and before the transitional period for the direct application of EU law
ended—the membership of Algeria also came to an end. Muriam Haleh Davisspoke is
analyzing this particular part of EU history in her doctoral thesis, Producing Eurafrica:
Development, Agriculture and Race in Algeria, 1958-1965, available at http://www.eui.eu/
Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/News/2013/07-30-EurafricaandDeGaulles
ConstantinePlan.aspx.
11. The UK held a referendum in 1975 on whether it should remain part of the
European Economic Community. While the Conservative and Liberal Parties
supported EC membership, Labour was divided. The result, 67.2% in favor, was a
rather strong endorsement. The Tories as members of the current coalition with the
Liberals have announced another referendum on the same question to be held after
the next general elections in 2017. Since neither Labour nor Liberals are supportive of
such a referendum, the announcement is a thinly veiled attempt by the Tories at
playing the European card to win another term in office, based on a majority of polls
showing that less than half of British voters are supporting EU membership.
12. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Turkey, are currently negotiating or waiting to negotiate their accession treaties.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo, have been promised “the prospect of
joining when they are ready.” See EU: Enlargement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 4,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_
en.htm.
13. Norway and Switzerland are obvious candidates, if their domestic views should
change. As mature democracies with functioning market economies, and not least as
potential net contributors to the budget of the EU, they would most likely be welcomed
with open arms. Whether Scotland, should it vote for independence on September 18,
2014, would remain in the EU without interruption or would have to apply and go
through the procedures of enlargement, seems unclear. The UK and Spain have
strongly voiced their views that Scotland would initially be forced out of the EU, in a
pretty obvious effort at dampening the enthusiasm of secessionist forces in both
countries. This view seems to be shared by Herman van Rompuy, the President of the
European Council. See Magnus Gardham, Van Rompuy Torpedoes SNP Claims on EU
Membership, HERALD (Scot.) (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/
referendum-news/van-rompuy-torpedoes-snp-claims-on-eu-membership.22950437.
However, the proponents of Scottish independence seem to be planning to negotiate
the terms of their EU membership while Scotland is still part of the UK and thus of the
EU, which would set a new precedent and certainly make for accession negotiations sui
generis.
In geographic terms, applications by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, may seem
far-fetched at the present time, but all three are already Member States of the Council
of Europe and their location will look much less remote after Turkey joins. Last but not
least, Belarus, Moldova, and the Ukraine are squat in the heart of Europe—both
geographically and from the perspective of a historically European identity—and it
would be difficult to deny an application for membership if and when these countries
fulfill the other requirements of accession. Indeed, so far only Morocco has been
politely told that it is not a European State (Morocco inquired informally in 1985 and
presented a formal application on July 20, 1987).
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enlargement is an ongoing story and the map of the EU will still
be re-drawn several more times before its final borders can be
determined. At the same time, the procedure for accession
negotiations is regulated only in very superficial terms,14 which
have remained largely unchanged over time. Yet, the procedure
has evolved considerably in practice. As always, when the law on
a particular question provides only a basic framework, the
discretionary powers of those who apply the law greatly increase.
The Council and the Commission have not shied away from
making use of those discretionary powers. It is the purpose of
the present article to show how individual Member States, or
However, one could argue that the inclusion by the Commission of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the European Neighbourhood
Policy (“ENP”), together with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, is an effort at drawing a line beyond which the EU will not
or should not grow. For more information on the ENP, see Communication from the
Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final (Mar. 11, 2003); Communication from the
Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 final May 12,
2004) [hereinafter Strategy Paper]. Although the Commission does not spell out in so
many words that neighbors shall not become members, it does speak of the ENP as “a
means to reinforce relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct
from the possibilities available to European countries under Article 49.” Strategy Paper,
supra, at 3 (emphasis added). Realistically, however, it will be for the future to tell who
may or may not become a member of the EU. If the first 60 years of European
integration are taken as guidance, our views on the desirability of the one or the other
country joining the EU may well change quite suddenly, if geopolitical and other
factors change. The current crisis in Ukraine may be an example of such a geopolitical
change. The fact that our current perspectives on enlargement are probably not the
last word on the matter is recognized even by the Commission in the more recent
Communication from the Commission, On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy,
COM (2006) 726 final (Dec 4, 2006): “The ENP remains distinct from the process of
EU enlargement—for our partners, considerably enhanced cooperation with the EU is
entirely possible without a specific prospect of accession and, for European neighbors,
without prejudging how their relationship with the EU may develop in future.” Id. at 2,
(emphasis added). The careful reader will see the distinction between European
neighbors and other “partners.” For critical review of the ENP see, for example,
Roland Dannreuther, Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European
Neighbourhood Policy, 11 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 183 (2006); Bernard Hoekman,
Regionalism and Development: The European Neighborhood Policy and Integration à la carte, 1
J. INT’L TRADE & DIPL. 1 (2007); Sandra Lavenex, A Governance Perspective on the
European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration Beyond Conditionality?, 15 J. EUROPEAN PUB.
POL’Y 938 (2008); Amichai Magen, The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European
Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383 (2006).
14. See TFEU, supra note 2, 2012 O.J. C 326; infra notes 22–26 and accompanying
text. Thorough analysis of the procedure is provided by Roger J. Goebel, Joining the
European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States,
1 LOY U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 15 (2013); see also TATHAM, supra note 2, at 239–69.
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rather individual leaders of those Member States, via the
unanimity requirement in the Council, were able to impose
their views on enlargement in the early years.15 Secondly, we will
show that this power has shifted noticeably to the Commission as
the number of Member States has grown. Nevertheless, strong
individual leaders in the Member States can still put their mark
on the timetable and conditions of enlargement. There just
seem to be fewer of those distinguished leaders today. Thirdly,
we try to predict the use of discretionary powers in ongoing and
future accession negotiations. To that end, we analyze how
accession negotiations were conducted with the Central and
Eastern European Countries (“CEECs”) which joined in 200416
and 2007,17 how and why the approach was modified for the
negotiations with Croatia, and how and why the strategy is
already different again for the next group of countries.
II. EU ENLARGEMENTS UP TO 1995
A. The Procedure
The so-called Treaty of Paris18 and the Treaties of Rome19
were signed by six founding members of the European Communities, France, Germany, Italy, and the BeNeLux countries, in
1951 and 1957 respectively. Since then, there have been seven
rounds of enlargement, one every 6-8 years on average. Given
that accession negotiations take several years and “[c]onsidering
15. Much has been written about the question how the national leaders develop
their specific preferences. In addition to subjective criteria like personal experience
and character of individual leaders, the history of European integration is full of
examples how these leaders were driven alternatively or simultaneously by political
constraints at home and broader international strategic considerations. See, e.g.,
Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 473 (1993) (providing many
further references).
16. Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
17. Bulgaria and Romania.
18. The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, or Treaty
of Paris, was signed on April 18, 1951, in Paris. Treaty of Paris, supra note 2. It entered
into force on July 23, 1952.
19. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, or Treaty of
Rome, and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community were both
signed on March 25, 1957, in Rome. They entered into force on January 1, 1958. Treaty
of Rome, supra note 2 .
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that new members continue to adjust to membership in the first
years after they accede—through ‘transitional arrangements’
and other flexibility mechanisms—the Union has been almost
continuously ‘in pre-accession’ since the first enlargement to
take in the UK, Denmark and Ireland in 1973.”20
During the entire time, the basic parameters of
enlargement have barely changed. Pursuant to Article 237 of the
Treaty of Rome,21 which later became Article O and is now
Article 49 TEU,22 the procedure is initiated when an interested
country submits an application. The Commission takes the next
step by writing a reasoned opinion whether or not the Union
should start negotiations with the candidate country. This
opinion—called avis—is addressed to the Council of Ministers.
20. KIRSTYN INGLIS, EVOLVING PRACTICE IN EU ENLARGEMENT: WITH CASE STUDIES
IN AGRI-FOOD AND ENVIRONMENT LAW 22 (2010).

21. The 1957 original wording of Article 237 is as follows:
Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It
shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after
obtaining the opinion of the Commission.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated
thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and
the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all
the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
22. The current version is as follows:
Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.
The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this
application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council,
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after
receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a
majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed
upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which
the Union is founded which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This
agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, at
43 [hereinafter TEU]. As can be seen, the differences are minor. On the one hand, the
EP gets to vote by a majority of its members (assent procedure, versus majority of votes
cast). On the other hand, there is a rather cryptic reference to “conditions of
eligibility.” Importantly, the unanimity requirement in the Council and the
requirement of ratification by all Member States (plus the candidate State) remain the
same.
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As the nature of the document suggests, the avis is an advisory
opinion and not binding on the Council. In general, the
Council follows the Commission, but sometimes it does not,
usually for obvious political reasons.23
Once the Council unanimously agrees to open negotiations
for accession with a candidate country, the Commission takes
the lead in the actual negotiations. Since the treaties are silent as
to the content of these negotiations, the Commission, with more
or less frequent and detailed instructions from the Council, has
significant discretion here. It is one of the primary goals of this
article to shed some additional light on what is going on behind
the scenes during these negotiations and how the procedure has
evolved over time.24 Once the Commission is satisfied that the
candidate country is ready for admission, it issues a second avis
to that end. The details of the agreement between the EU and
the candidate country, including any transitional periods during
which some of the mutual rights and obligations are not yet fully
applied, are then spelled out in a Treaty of Accession. Once the
Treaty is ready, it goes to the European Parliament for its
“assent”25 and then the Council takes another unanimous vote
approving the results of the negotiations and the signing of the
23. In 1976 the Commission was ambivalent about starting accession negotiations
with Greece and proposed a pre-accession period for Greece to get better prepared.
However, the Council decided to open the accession negotiations anyways. See TATHAM,
supra note 2, at 30–31. With regard to Macedonia, the Commission recommended in
2005 that “negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with
[Macedonia] once it has reached a sufficient degree of compliance with the membership
criteria.” Communication from the Commission, Commission Opinion on the Application from
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Membership, at 7, COM (2005) 562 final
(emphasis added). By October 2009, the Commission found sufficient progress and
recommended the opening of negotiations with Macedonia, a position it repeated in
2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. However, the Council still decided not to start those
negotiations. In the first case, the political background was the desire to strengthen the
struggling democracy in Greece. In the second case, the problem was a veto by Greece
over what has been called “the name game,” i.e. the Greek claim that the name
“Macedonia” belongs exclusively to its northern province, which is unsuccessfully
skirted by the “other” Macedonia calling itself, for the time being, “The Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).” See also infra note 154.
24. A good “road map” can also be found in Goebel, supra note 14.
25. Normally, the EP approves legislation by a majority of votes cast. Thus, absent
MEPs and/or abstaining votes are not counted at all. The assent procedure, by
contrast, requires a majority of members to approve, i.e. absent members and
abstentions are counted as votes against the proposal; compare TFEU, supra note 2, art.
231, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 231, with TEU, supra note 22, 2012 O.J. C 326.
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Treaty of Accession. After that, the Treaty goes to the Member
States and to the candidate country for ratification. Last but not
least, even with all approvals given and all ratifications
accomplished, the Council has the final say whether and when
to give the force of law to the Treaty of Accession.26 This final
decision also determines the official date of accession.
The accession negotiations with a candidate country preceding its admission as a new Member State essentially serve two
purposes. On the one hand, the EU wants to ensure that the
candidate country is “willing and able” to take on the
obligations of membership. In practice, this means that the
candidate country has to adapt its legal system to become
compatible with the common rules of the Union, the so-called
acquis communautaire.27 It has been the position of the Union
from the outset that candidate countries have to accept the body
of law as it stands and that the EU will not re-negotiate its
hard-won legislative and regulatory progress every time a new
country joins. Thus, nowadays some 160,000 pages of treaties,
regulations, directives, and other legal rules have to be
transposed into the legal system of the candidate countries.
Since the EU has much greater leverage prior to accession, it
basically insists that these far-reaching reforms of the legal
system of the candidate country are completed before the state
is admitted. Willing and able nowadays also means that various
26. To be sure, the candidate country could also withdraw its application until this
time. This may become necessary if the ratification fails, as was the case twice with
Norway after the population rejected membership in the EU in a referendum. It could
also happen that a political dispute erupts between the EU or one or more of its
Member States and the candidate country, with the consequence that either side
changes its mind about accession, at least until the matter is resolved. An example for
the latter is provided by Slovenia’s last minute threat not to ratify the Accession Treaty
of Croatia, unless Croatia dropped a law suit regarding the liquidation of a Slovenian
bank in the early 1990s, during the struggle for independence of the two countries,
which caused financial harm to Croatian account holders. See Andrew Rettman,
Slovenia Puts 172mn price tag on Croatia’s EU Entry, EUOBSERVER (Sept. 21, 2012, 9:26
AM), http://euobserver.com/enlargement/117629.
27. The acquis is the body of EU law as it stands, i.e. the Treaties, as amended, the
legislative and administrative acts of the institutions, in particular the regulations,
directives, and decisions, the judgments of the European Court of Justice, international
agreements involving the EU, and various soft-law and other acts and instruments, see
infra Part IV.B. For further detail see Stephen Weatherill, Safeguarding the Acquis
Communautaire, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 153
(Ton Heukels et al. eds., 1998).
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institutional structures may have to be modified or created in
the acceding country to ensure the real-world application of the
acquis after accession.
On the other hand, the EU has to modify its own
institutional structures to make room for the incoming Member
State(s). Most importantly, this involves the determination of
the number of seats and votes the new countries will be
allocated in the various institutions. Since every enlargement
invariably changes the dynamics of voting and the distribution
of power in the institutions, this procedure is much more
complicated than it sounds. However, only the former element,
the preparation of the candidate country or countries, is subject
to the accession negotiations with that country. The internal
revision of the institutional structures is done by the old
Members with limited or no input from the candidate
countries.28 That process has been well-described before29 and
shall not be the focus of the present Article.

28. The chapter “Institutions” is not negotiated with the candidate country or
countries at all.
29. See, e.g., Anthony Arnull, Europe’s Nemesis? The Long Road to the Lisbon Treaty, in
EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HJALTE RASMUSSEN 11
(Henning Koch et al. eds., 2010); Renaud Dehousse & Florence Deloche-Gaudez,
Voting in the Council of Ministers: The Impact of Enlargement, in FIFTY YEARS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 21 (Andrea Ott & Ellen Vos eds.,
2009); Bruno de Witte, Adapting the Institutional System of the EU to Enlargement, in THE
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 209 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003); Roger J.
Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria,
Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1092 (1995); Roger J. Goebel, The European
Union in Transition: The Treaty of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in
Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 455 (2004); Neill Nugent, Political Dynamics in the Enlarged
European Union, in ADJUSTING TO EU ENLARGEMENT: RECURRING ISSUES IN A NEW
SETTING 91 (Constantine A. Stephanou ed., 2006); John A. Usher, Assessment of the
Treaty of Nice – Goals of Institutional Reform, in THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND:
ENLARGEMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 183 (Mads Andenæs & John Usher eds.,
2003); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Amsterdam and the Quest for Constitutional Democracy, in
LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY 1 (David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds.,
1999). A nice review of the institutional structures and powers as they stand today can
be found in Roger J. Goebel, Supranational? Federal? Intergovernmental? The Governmental
Structure of the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 77 (2012).
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B. The First Northern Enlargement: Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom in 1973
The political component of the decision by the Council of
Ministers of whether or not to open negotiations with a
candidate country, and whether or not to fast-track a country for
membership, has been well established. More importantly, the
Council does not speak as one European institution in the way
the Commission tends to do. The Council is where the Member
States seek to safeguard their national interests. While majority
voting is nowadays possible for many questions, several factors
make sure that decisions are rarely taken against the will and
interests of any of the larger Member States: First, a number of
important issues, such as the budget as well as any questions
related to treaty changes or enlargement, remain subject to
unanimity even today. Second, there is a clear preference in the
Council for decision-making by consensus even in areas where
(qualified) majority voting would be possible. Third, even if the
Council is ready to call a vote and a single or a small group of
Member States risk being overruled, they can remind the other
Member States of the preference for consensus by invoking the
infamous Luxembourg Compromise.30 In the present context,
30. After acrimonious discussions over agriculture and majority voting, the
European Council agreed on January 30, 1966, in Luxembourg as follows: “Where, in
the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the
Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the
Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions
which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual
interests and those of the Community.” This is a classic agreement to disagree and
leaves open the question how long is “a reasonable time” for further negotiations and
what happens when those eventually seem futile. For analysis see, for example, Andrew
Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and Conventional Statecraft
in the European Community, 45 INT’L ORG. 19 (1991); Anthony Teasdale, The Luxembourg
Compromise, in MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 104 (1995).
It has been argued that the Luxembourg Compromise was overcome with the formal
introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council via the Single European Act in
1985. See PHILIPPE DE SCHOUTHEETE, THE CASE FOR EUROPE: UNITY, DIVERSITY, AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37 (2000). However, subsequent practice shows
that the Council is still trying to make decisions by consensus whenever possible and
does not actually vote very often, even if it could. The impact of the change is more
psychological. As Weiler has pointed out, while the Council used to negotiate “under
the shadow of the veto” when it absolutely had to accommodate every member to get
anything done, it is now negotiating “under the shadow of the vote,” i.e. the chair can
always call for a vote, if a country or a small group of countries is holding up a decision
on selfish or otherwise unreasonable grounds. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
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due to the unanimity requirement, the decision of whether or
not to open negotiations with a candidate country, and whether
or not to finish them with an agreement, is ultimately in the
hands of each and every Member State, and its political leadership, and they have not been shy to make use of their leverage.
The early attempts at enlargement provide a case on
point.31 When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
with its innovative supranational elements was created in 1951,
Britain’s position was still that “no iota of British sovereignty”
could possibly be negotiated away.32 Therefore, the UK wanted
only intergovernmental cooperation for security and trade.
Instead of focusing on Europe, Britain saw its future in its
“special relationship” with the United States and its preferential
trade arrangements with current and former colonies in the
Commonwealth. However, by the late 1950s, it became
increasingly clear that the British economy needed additional
stimulation. From 1950 to 1958, the UK economy only grew by
an annual average of 2.7%. By contrast, the economy of
Germany had grown by an annual average of 7.8% during the
same period and by 1958 Germany had surpassed Britain as
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2460–83 (1991). In effect, the bar for what
are “vital national interests” has been put significantly higher but by no means entirely
out of reach. See also Renaud Dehousse & Giandomenico Majone, The Institutional
Dynamics of European Integration: From the Single Act to the Maastricht Treaty, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMILE NOËL 91 (Stephen Martin &
Emile Noël eds., 1994); Pierre Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the “Single European
Act”, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1987).
31. Although the accession of Britain, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973 was the first
actual enlargement, several countries knocked on the door in Brussels before Britain
did. Israel inquired about membership in October 1958, Greece in June 1959, and
Turkey, for the first time, in August 1959. See DEREK URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF
EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1945, at 116 (2d ed. 1995).
32. The phrase is from a document the ruling Labour Party produced in 1950
entitled “European Unity” (here quoted from NORMAN DAVIS, EUROPE: A HISTORY
1065 (1996)). This did not change after the Conservatives, under Winston Churchill,
took over in October 1951. Already in his famous Zurich speech on September 19,
1946, Churchill had advocated the “United States of Europe” as a construct for the
Continent but not for UK inclusion. While this is the general interpretation of the
Zurich speech, Churchill’s biographer has a very interesting and more differentiated
take on the subject. See ROY JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY 813–19 (2002). The
term “United States of Europe” was not of Churchill’s invention. Napoleon Bonaparte
may have been the first to use it around 1850–1852, although he had a somewhat
different mechanism for unification in mind. See FELIX MARKHAM, NAPOLEON 257
(1966). More importantly, Victor Hugo invoked “les États-Unies d’Europe” in a
remarkably visionary speech at the International Peace Congress in Paris in 1849.
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Europe’s export champion.33 Even Italy, at 5.8%, and France, at
4.6%, had consistently outperformed Europe’s former industrial
powerhouse.34 Britain was at risk of being left behind.
Therefore, Britain now wanted closer ties in Europe, but still
resisted the transfer of authority to the European institutions
with the potential of majority voting in the Council and binding
judgments from the Court of Justice. Even while the ECSC
countries were negotiating the European Economic Community
(EEC) Treaty, the UK proposed a West European Free Trade
Area as an alternative.35 When Britain was unable to prevent
“the inner six” from going forward with the EEC—or Common
Market—it gathered the remaining “outer seven” into the
European Free Trade Area (“EFTA”),36 an intergovernmental
organization where decisions were made by unanimity, if at all,
and no uncontrollable commission of technocrats could try to
challenge national sovereignty and interest.
British ambivalence, or rather the perpetual tug-of-war in
Britain between pro-European leaders, who are willing to accept
limited transfers of sovereignty to Brussels for the common goals
of European integration, and Eurosceptics, who believe that
Britain is better off outside the European Union,37 has been the
hallmark of the UK’s relationship with “the Continent” ever
since. Just over a year after founding EFTA and before the
Common Market could really demonstrate that it was the

33. For an excellent discussion of German economic development after WWII, see
WILLIAM I. HITCHCOCK, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE: THE TURBULENT HISTORY OF A
DIVIDED CONTINENT 1945 TO THE PRESENT 141–47 (2008); see also STEVEN OZMENT, A
MIGHTY FORTRESS – A NEW HISTORY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE 289–325 (2004).
34. See MARK GILBERT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A CONCISE HISTORY 69 (2012);
see also HITCHCOCK, supra note 33, at 232–33.
35. See TATHAM, supra note 2, at 8, with further references.
36. Besides the UK, the founding members of the EFTA were Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, essentially a ring of mostly smaller
countries in the periphery around the core formed by the EEC founders Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands. The EFTA Treaty, the so-called
Stockholm Convention, was signed in January 1960 and can be found at http://
www.efta.int/legal-texts/efta-convention. It was overhauled in 2001 by the so-called
Vaduz Convention. Id.
37. For in-depth analysis, see ANTHONY FORSTER, EUROSCEPTICISM IN
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH POLITICS: OPPOSITION TO EUROPE IN THE BRITISH
CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR PARTIES SINCE 1945 (2002).
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economically superior model of integration,38 Britain formally
applied for membership in the EEC in August 1961.
Negotiations for accession were promptly opened but before an
agreement could be reached, the French President de Gaulle,
on January 14, 1963, de facto vetoed UK accession.39
While Andrew Moravcsik argues that de Gaulle’s veto was
mainly motivated by economic considerations, namely the
incompatible British model of supporting its agricultural sector,
and the British insistence on preferential trading rights for its
Commonwealth partners, in particular relatively advanced
economies like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,40 this is not
borne out by de Gaulle’s memoirs and biographers. Of course,
the Commonwealth ties and the dispute over agriculture, where
Britain would have offered a better and ultimately far less
expensive alternative to the emerging CAP, did not help.41 And
38. The pioneers of analysis of different stages or models of economic integration
are JAN TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1965); BELA BALASSA,
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (2d ed. 1961). For a specific comparison of
the economics of free trade areas versus customs unions, see Anthony J. Venables, The
Economics of Preferential Trading Areas and Regional Integration, in THE ECONOMICS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 55 (Michael Artis & Frederick Nixson eds., 2007). The best
overall analysis of the economics of European integration is provided by JACQUES
PELKMANS, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: METHODS AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2006).
39. French President Charles de Gaulle, Veto on British Membership of the EEC
(Jan. 14, 1963), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=
0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=125401 [hereinafter de Gaulle
Speech].
40. See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE
POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT 189 (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, De Gaulle
Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part 1),
J. COLD WAR STUD., Spring 2000, at 3; Andrew Moravcsik, De Gaulle Between Grain and
Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part 2), J. COLD WAR
STUD., Fall 2000, at 4. For criticism of Moravcsik’s thesis, see Robert Lieshout et al., De
Gaulle, Moravcsik and The Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence, J. COLD WAR
STUD., Fall 2004, at 89.
41. The pros and cons of the CAP, both in historical context when it was created
and later, when it became an expensive millstone round the EU’s neck, are well
developed in DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION: AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 44–55, 59–68, 333–50 (2d ed. 1999); see also BERKELEY HILL,
UNDERSTANDING THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (2012); KIRAN KLAUS PATEL,
FERTILE GROUND FOR EUROPE? THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY SINCE 1945 (2009); POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 181–205 (Helen Wallace et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010). Specifically for the context of
enlargement, see Nicholas C. Baltas, The Impact of Enlargement on EU Agriculture, in
ADJUSTING TO EU ENLARGEMENT: RECURRING ISSUES IN A NEW SETTING, supra note 29,
at 46, with further references.
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while these could conceivably be filed as questions whether
Britain was “willing and able” to accept the conditions of
membership, it is beyond doubt that de Gaulle’s main
motivations were political.42 First, it is by now well documented
that de Gaulle spent much energy and recurrent opportunities
from 1959 to 1969 to contain American influence on Europe
and other parts of the world.43 De Gaulle was driven by his desire
to re-establish France as a global power. His vision for Europe
was one of a Europe of Nation States under the leadership of
France.44 He resented “Atlanticists” like Paul-Henri Spaak
(Belgium), Josef Luns (the Netherlands), and Ludwig Erhard
(Germany), because of their desire to tie Western Europe tightly
to America and defend it via NATO against Soviet imperialism.
He referred to the United Kingdom as “the Trojan Horse” that
would bring the US into the European Common Market.45
Second, de Gaulle did not want a dilution of French influence
over the EEC, which he saw as inevitable with enlargement. His
biographer reports that on December 16, 1962, in front of the
British Prime Minister Macmillan and the French Prime
Minister Pompidou, “the General insisted that the Common
Market should remain as it was . . . . British adhesion would
lead other countries to try to join, changing the nature of the
organisation.”46 Making it even clearer that this was not a
42. See the excellent biography, JONATHAN FENBY, THE GENERAL: CHARLES DE
GAULLE AND THE FRANCE HE SAVED 486–88 (2012).
43. FENBY, supra note 42, at 516–523; see also de Gaulle Speech, supra note 39, in
which he justified his veto on UK accession inter alia with the danger that the
Community “would [become] a colossal Atlantic community under American
dependence and direction.” This was also at the heart of the French withdrawal from
NATO. Besides de Gaulle’s desire for France—instead of America—to play the first
fiddle in Europe, there were also episodes in American politics, like McCarthyism and
the Red Scare, that made the country look “politically immature” and “obsessed by
Communism,” HITCHCOCK, supra note 33, at 156, potentially dragging the World into a
military confrontation with the Russians and thus another World war.
44. De Gaulle told Dean Rusk around 1960 that France was “the heart and soul of
European culture,” while “the British are not Europeans.” See DEAN RUSK, AS I SAW IT
270 (1990).
45. FENBY, supra note 42, at 472. This is confirmed in Stanley Hoffman, De Gaulle,
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, 18 INT’L ORG. 1, 14 (1964). Sure enough, the Americans
did hope that British entry into the EC would take the “special relationship” into
Western Europe as a whole. See RUSK, supra note 44, at 267.
46. FENBY, supra note 42, at 502. Indeed, the UK had been joined in its first
application in August 1961 by Denmark and Ireland, and Norway followed suit on April
30, 1962. See MARK GILBERT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A CONCISE HISTORY 70 (2012).
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question of whether or not Britain met the conditions of
membership, on January 14, 1963 de Gaulle confided to his
aides that “Britain would not enter the Common Market in his
lifetime.”47 He delivered on his promise when a new Prime
Minister in Britain, Harold Wilson, made a second attempt of
bringing the UK into the EEC in 1967. De Gaulle’s biographer
writes verbatim: “In the early summer [of 1967], . . . Harold
Wilson renewed Britain’s bid to enter the Common Market, but
got nowhere with the General [de Gaulle] who had already used
a press conference to accuse the United Kingdom of lining up
with Washington to subvert the continent.”48 Only after de
Gaulle finally stepped down on April 28, 1969, at the age of 79,
the way became clear for a third British bid for membership in
the EEC, and it did take until January 1973, indeed not during
de Gaulle’s lifetime, for accession of Britain, Denmark, and
Ireland to become effective.49
C. The Southern Enlargements: Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in
1986
Barely enlarged from six to nine Member States, the EC
had to deal with crises on several fronts. After building up large
trade deficits with Germany and Japan, the United States had
ended the convertibility of the dollar for gold on August 15,
47. FENBY, supra note 42, at 503. Harold Macmillan, in his memoirs, recalls a
conversation with the French Minister of Agriculture pursuant to which France was
then the only cock in the henhouse and would not accept another rooster on the dung
heap. See HAROLD MACMILLAN, AT THE END OF THE DAY 1961-1963, at 365 (1973). In
his own memoirs, de Gaulle claims that already on September 14, 1958, in his very first
summit with Konrad Adenauer, he told the German Chancellor that he opposed
British entry into the EEC. See CHARLES DE GAULLE, MEMOIRS OF HOPE: RENEWAL AND
ENDEAVOR 178 (Terence Kilmartin trans., 1972).
48. FENBY, supra note 42, at 551. Gilbert confirms Fenby’s analysis:
De Gaulle dismissed the second British attempt to gain membership – during
the premiership of the Labour leader Harold Wilson in 1967 – almost
contemptuously. In May 1967, de Gaulle warned of “destructive upheaval” if
Britain succeeded in entering the EEC. A visit from Wilson in June 1967, at
which the British prime minister bumptiously told de Gaulle that Britain
would not “take no for an answer”, was to little avail. In November 1967, de
Gaulle expressed his absolute opposition to British entry.
GILBERT, supra note 46, at 83–84 (footnote omitted).
49. The Act of Accession, the Treaty of Accession, and the Final Act and
Declarations of the Treaty of Accession for the UK, Denmark, and Ireland can be
found at http://www.eurotreaties.com/eurotexts.html#ukaccession.
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1971. Subsequently, the dollar continued to fall against the
European currencies but also exposed tension between the
latter, ultimately wrecking early plans for some kind of monetary
union. A second external shock was added when the Arab
countries in the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries
(OPEC) imposed an embargo against the United States and
several European countries supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur
War of October 1973. Egypt and Syria had launched the war to
recapture territories lost in the 1967 Six Day War. Within days,
the price of oil quadrupled in European markets and the first oil
crisis of 1973 quickly exposed fundamental disunity between the
foreign policy priorities of the nine EC Member States.
By the end of 1974, therefore, the grand design of the October 1972 Paris summit, of achieving a European Union
[including monetary union] by the end of the 1970s, was
looking somewhat battered.50

With deepening of European integration on hold, an
opportunity at widening soon presented itself. Greece returned
from military dictatorship to democracy in July 1974 and within
a year applied for full membership in the EC. It had been an
associated country since 1961 and even back then, the
Association Agreement had already pointed to the possibility of
full membership.51 Any progress on membership negotiations
was suspended, however, after the military coup of April 1967.
Having remained neutral in World War II, Spain and
Portugal did not undergo fundamental reforms in the post-war
period. They remained under fascist dictatorial rulers and their
economies and standards of living remained stuck on the level
of developing nations. Since democracy is one of the
requirements for EU membership, it was easy to exclude
Portugal and Spain after World War II from participating in the
European integration process. A first application by Spain in
1962 received no formal response but triggered a discussion on
the lack of democracy and liberty in that country. A second
50. GILBERT, supra note 46, at 103.
51. See Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic
Community and Greece art. 72, 1963 O.J. P 26. The Association Agreement with
Greece was the first of its kind and the first to establish a so-called Association Council
with actual decision-making powers for the implementation of the Agreement. It
became the blueprint for many association agreements after it.
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approach in 1964 at least led to the negotiation and ratification
of a preferential trade agreement.52 The third attempt followed
after the death of General Franco in 1975. At the same time,
Portugal had finally shed the dictatorship in the Carnation
Revolution of 1974 and held its first democratic elections in
1975.
Within a short timeframe, the EC received three
applications for a substantial Southern Enlargement. A fourth
country, Turkey, had been placed in a holding pattern in 196253
but had also been given a promise of accession by 1995. In a
report to the European Parliament, the applications were
described as follows:
On 12 June 1975 the Greeks submitted a formal application
for full membership of the EEC. This application has been
favourably received, mainly for political rather than economic
reasons, and negotiations are presently in progress.
On 28 March 1977, Portugal lodged an official application
for membership of the EEC; . . . . Mainly for political reasons
this application has been generally welcomed by the present
members of the Community although doubts have been
expressed concerning the Portuguese economy’s ability to
withstand the pressures EEC membership will bring.

The Association Agreement signed between the EEC
and Turkey in 1962 envisages eventual full
membership in 1995 . . .
The Spanish government [submitted a formal application on 28 July 1977].54
The argument that rapid integration would be highly
desirable to strengthen the infant democracies should have
been equally relevant in all three and maybe all four candidate
52. See Agreement Between the European Economic Community and Spain, 1970
O.J. L 182 .
53. See Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic
Community and Turkey, 1964 O.J. 217.
54. See EC-Accession of Four Mediterranean Countries and Regional Policy, EUR.
PARL. DOC. PE 49.154 3 (1977) (original underlining removed, emphasis added). Royo
confirms that “it is generally acknowledged that the underlying reasons for the
integration of Portugal and Spain in the European Community were political.” See
Sebastián Royo, The Experience of Spain and Portugal in the European Union: Lessons for
Latin America 9 (Miami Eur. Union Ctr., Working Paper Series No. 2, 2002), with
further references.
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countries. Indeed, democracy in Spain almost fell victim to a
military coup in February 1981.55 However, the negotiations with
Greece were substantially quicker than the ones with Portugal
and Spain, and Turkey was not even considered for 23 years. We
will try to show that this was only partly due to issues with
objective criteria and conditions.
The Commission avis on the Greek application was
lukewarm.56 On the one hand, the Commission recommended
that accession negotiations should be opened. On the other
hand, the Commission proposed a pre-accession period during
which Greece would receive financial aid to prepare itself for
membership, in particular by growing its economy and making
various institutional and structural reforms. Furthermore, the
Commission predicted various transitional periods after
accession.57 Greece was not happy with the cautionary
recommendations of the Commission, which were seen as an
attempt at delaying Greek accession indefinitely.58 When the
Commission also suggested that Greece and Turkey should find
“a just and lasting solution” to their differences,59 the Greeks
complained about political meddling outside of Commission
competences.60
The decisive Council meeting provides a lesson on
decision-making by consensus. The Council could not agree
55. Colonel Tejero launched the failed attempt—often referred to as “El
Tejerazo”—by taking the delegates of the Spanish Parliament and a number of cabinet
members hostage in the evening of February 23, 1981. The rebels managed to occupy
strategic points in the city of Valencia with tanks but a similar attempt failed in Madrid.
The rebellious elements in the Spanish army were protesting against political and
economic instability as well as separatist tendencies, in particular in the Basque region.
After the King refused to endorse the coup and insisted on return of the democratically
elected Government, the coup collapsed and its leaders were sentenced to lengthy
prison terms.
56. Tsalicoglou commented that “the clarity of [the Commission] affirmation left
a lot to be desired.” See IACOVOS S. TSALICOGLOU, NEGOTIATING FOR ENTRY: THE
ACCESSION OF GREECE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 30 (1995).
57. See Opinion on Greek Application for Membership, E.U. BULL. No. 2/76
(1976).
58. See Susannah Verney, The Dynamics of EU Accession: Turkish Travails in
Comparative Perspective, 9 J. S. EUR. & BALKANS 307, 311 (2007).
59. In 1974, Cypriot nationalists with support from the military junta in Athens
had deposed the Cypriot President Makarios triggering a Turkish invasion in northern
Cyprus for the protection of the Turkish minority on the island. For a while it seemed
that Greece and Turkey might go to war against each other.
60. Verney, supra note 58.
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unanimously on the innovative strategy suggested by the
Commission61 and, because no Member State government
wanted to be seen as the one opposing Greek accession, fell
back on the default model and decided by consensus62 to open
the accession negotiations without delay. Nevertheless, what
eventually became the “good neighbourliness” criterion,
remained a constant element in the procedure, to the point that
Greece had to commit itself not to block Turkish accession at a
later stage.63 Negotiations with Greece were initiated on July 27,
1976. Halfway through the negotiations, Portugal and Spain
applied. In particular Spain, with its much larger agricultural
sector, was not going to be so easily digested into the EU.64
The problem with Spain, in particular, was not only the cost
of including the Spanish farmers in the CAP. France and, to a
lesser extent, also Italy and Greece, feared the competition in
the markets for vegetables, fruit, olive oil, and other
Mediterranean agricultural products.65 Spanish producers enjoy
a climatic advantage allowing them to bring their produce
earlier in the season to the northern markets. Their cost of
production, hence the prices for their agricultural products,
were also noticeably lower than in the EC. As a consequence,
riper, tastier, and cheaper fruit and vegetables from Spain come
to France and other northern countries in the spring and
continue to displace local produce well into the summer, to the
great frustration of the local farmers.66 Another contentious
61. While the pre-accession/post-accession strategy was ultimately not used for
Greece, it was “dusted down” for the negotiations with the CEECs in the 1990s. See
TATHAM, supra note 2, at 31.
62. The reader should note the important difference between a unanimous
decision and a decision by consensus. The former requires a vote where everybody says
yes. The latter merely requires an end to the conversation with nobody saying no.
63. See Verney, supra note 58, at 312.
64. To put things into perspective: Spanish accession was to increase the overall
land area used in the EC for agricultural production by 30%, and the population living
off the land by 31%. See TATHAM, supra note 2, at 37.
65. See, e.g., JAMES D. GAISFORD ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR EU ACCESSION
NEGOTIATIONS: AGRI-FOOD ISSUES IN THE EU’S EASTWARD EXPANSION 11 (2003).
66. These effects continue today. Possible consequences are nicely illustrated by
the dispute that led to the Judgment of the European Court of Justice of December 9,
1997 in Commission of the European Communications v. French Republic
(Coordination Rurale), Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6959. French farmers had
adopted guerilla tactics, attacking and torching Spanish trucks loaded with agricultural
produce at the toll stations on the French highways. For maximum publicity effect, the

1370 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1349
issue with Spain was the division of the fishing quotas. The
Spanish fishing fleet at the time was larger than the entire
fishing fleet of the EU.67 Accession should normally have given
the Spanish fishermen access to the common fishing grounds in
the North Sea, in competition with British, Dutch, Irish, and
other fishermen. To mediate this impact, France, in particular,
pursued a policy of delaying the entry of Spain and Portugal.
Greece was ultimately able to avoid “the globalization” of the
Southern Enlargement package and moved ahead with the
conclusion of the Accession Treaty on May 28, 1979. Greek
accession became effective on January 1, 1981, although a
general transition period of five years for the application of the
acquis by Greece was also provided, as well as restrictions on the
free movement of Greek workers and tomatoes to the old
Member States until the end of 1987.68
Caught up in a tight race toward the presidential elections,
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing de facto made the Iberian
strikes were announced in advance and the media were invited. Instead of protecting
the property of the Spanish traders, the French government declined to intervene and
instead paid compensation. After the case was brought by the EU Commission, the
Court of Justice ruled that France had a positive obligation to protect the free
movement of goods against private disruptions.
67. See Royo, supra note 54, at 17. The problem was initially resolved by dividing
the European fishing opportunities into national quotas. While all fishing fleets could
work the common areas in the Atlantic and elsewhere, they were not allowed to exceed
their quota and, at least in theory, had to leave the rest for the other Member States. In
practice, the EU experienced perpetual problems with the enforcement of the quotas.
See, e.g., Spain v. Commission, Case C-179/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-1264; see also Commission
v. Netherlands, Case 290/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3101; Commission v. France, Case C-62/89,
[1990] E.C.R. I-946; Commission v. France, Case C-244/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-186;
Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-52/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-3092; Commission v.
France, Case C-52/95, [1995] E.C.R. I-4443; Commission v. France, Case C-333/99,
[2001] E.C.R. I-1039; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-454/99, [2002] E.C.R.
I-10351; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-140/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-10379;
Commission v. France, Joined Cases C-418 & C-419/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-3969. Another
crisis was triggered when Spanish fishermen registered their boats in the UK in order
to exploit the British quota. This “quota hopping,” and the British countermeasures,
made several trips to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. See, for example,
Agegate, Case C-3/87, [1989] E.C.R. 4459; Jaderow, Case C-216/87, [1989] E.C.R.
4509; Commission v. Ireland, Case C-93/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-4569; Commission v.
United Kingdom, Case C-279/89, [1992] ECR I-5817, as well as the famous
“Factortame” decision: The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte:
Factortame Ltd and Others, Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-2433, about interim relief
against an Act of Parliament in the UK.
68. TATHAM, supra note 2, at 33.
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enlargement hostage to the EU budget negotiations with the
UK.69 Once the agricultural issues and the budgetary questions
were settled at the European Council summit in Fontainebleau
in June 1984, the road seemed clear for Portugal and Spain to
join in 1986. At the last minute, Greece used the need for
unanimity in the approval of the accession treaties to extract
compensation for the anticipated loss in sales of its
Mediterranean agricultural products to Spanish competition.70
Even after accession in 1986, Spain was given a transition period
of seven, and for some products ten years, before it would have
full access to the internal market for its agricultural products.
D. The EFTA Enlargement: Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995
The completion of the Internal Market at the end of 1992
elevated the EU to the next level of economic integration and
widened the gap with the countries remaining in the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA). To alleviate fears in these countries
that the Internal Market would become a “Fortress Europe”71
with high barriers to entry for outsiders, the EU negotiated the
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement with its EFTA
neighbors to provide mutual access not only for trade in goods
but for all factors of production, as well as a level of
harmonization of laws.72 In many ways, the EEA ended up
providing for almost all obligations of full membership in the
EU and most of the rights, but without the crucial access to the
institutions and the decision-making procedures in the EU. EEA
69. Royo, supra note 54, at 18.
70. TATHAM, supra note 2, at 43.
71. Although coined already during World War II, the term gained notoriety after
the conclusion of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which brought about the
replacement of internal border controls between the Member States with enhanced
controls at the outer borders of the so-called Schengen Area. After ratification by
Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, the Agreement
entered into force in 2000. See 2000 OJ L 239/13. Since then, the following countries
have joined the Schengen Area: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Of the current
EU Member States, Ireland and the United Kingdom have declined to join and
Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia are candidate countries.
72. See The Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994/17, 1994 O.J. L
1/3, available at http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement; see also ACCORD EEE:
COMMENTAIRES ET REFLEXIONS (Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod ed., 1992).
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members would have to apply much of EU law, without having a
voice and a vote in the making of that law.73 Therefore, it was
not a particularly popular agreement, even among the EFTA
governments that had asked for it as an alternative to
membership without obvious transfers of sovereignty.74 Even
without institutional membership, however, the EAA Agreement
went too far for the Swiss electorate and was rejected in a
referendum on December 6, 1992. Switzerland had been a
driving force behind the EAA and in many ways the Agreement
was tailored for Swiss needs more than the other EFTA
countries. Without Swiss membership, the EAA lost even more
of its appeal. At the same time, the design of the EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty
turned out to be sufficiently flexible to allow for membership by
neutral countries. Last but not least, the fall of the iron curtain
ended certain restrictions on the international relations of
Austria75 and Finland.76 All this combined motivated Austria,
Finland, Norway and Sweden to seek full membership in the
EU.77

73. Hundreds, if not thousands, of EU regulations and directives, in particular
those relating to the internal market, state in their header that they are a “Text with
EEA relevance.” See, e.g., Directive 2005/36 on the Recognition of Professional
Qualifications, 2005 O.J. L 255/22. Naturally, the non-EU members of the EEA were
not included in the Council or EP meetings that led to the finalization of the drafts and
certainly did not get to vote on the document itself.
74. Tatham writes, “By the end of the negotiations in 1991, most of the EFTA
States had come to share the Austrian viewpoint, viz., that the EEA was merely a step in
the process to full EEC membership.” See TATHAM, supra note 2, at 60.
75. Pursuant to the Staatsvertrag betreffend die Wiederherstellung eines
unabhängigen und demokratischen Österreich [State Treaty for the Re-establishment
of an Independent and Democratic Austria], May 15, 1955, 217 U.N.T.S. 223, the Four
Allied Powers prohibited Austria from any form of union with Germany. The Soviet
Union used this Treaty for decades to prevent Austrian ambitions of joining the EU.
76. Finland and the Soviet Union had entered into an Agreement of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (“YYA Treaty”) in 1948. Under this Agreement, it
was Finnish policy not to seek Western alliances in order to maintain friendly relations
with the Soviets. The policy ended only in 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union.
77. Austria had already applied on July 17, 1989, but had not pursued the application during the negotiations for the EEA. Sweden had also applied earlier, on July 1,
1991. Finland applied on March 18, 1992. Even Norway applied on November 25, 1992,
right before the Swiss rejection of the EEA, although the outcome of the Swiss
referendum was not at all clear at that time.
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For the EU, this was a welcome development. The EFTA
partners were known to be stable democracies, reliable trading
partners, and above all relatively wealthy, in particular when
compared to the countries of the Southern Enlargements of
1981 and 1986 and the prospective candidates in Central and
Eastern Europe, all of which turned out to be net-recipients of
EU funds. Negotiations began in February 1993 and were
concluded after just a little over a year. The Accession Treaties
were signed at the European Council meeting in Corfu on June
24, 1994. By this time, however, accession was not particularly
popular any more among the people in the candidate countries.
Therefore, the required referenda were staged in such a way
that the partners tried to build momentum. Austria went first on
June 12, 1994 and secured 66.4% of the popular vote for
membership.78 Finland was second on October 16, 1994 and still
got a respectable 56.9% in support. Then came Sweden. The
national debate in Sweden had been particularly acrimonious
and the government had been accused of having sold out on
Swedish interests. Nevertheless, on November 13, 1994, 52% of
Swedes voted in favor of EU membership. This rather narrow
result was enough for Sweden but not to sway the sceptics in
Norway. On November 28, 1994, 52.5% of Norwegians voted
against membership in the EU and the country had to withdraw
its accession agreement for a second time.
III. THE GREAT EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 2004–2007
While the EU was still finalizing the accession of the EFTA
group, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the reforms in Central
and Eastern Europe had already yielded a number of additional
applications for membership.79 Thus, it was clear that the EU
78. In the negotiations, Austria had used a model of large delegations. Where the
other candidates sent only a small number of experts from the respective ministries to
the negotiations on a particular chapter of the acquis, Austria sent large delegations
including politicians from opposition parties and even representatives of employer
associations, trade unions, and civil society organizations. While this often produced a
level of ridicule in Brussels, it worked like a charm in the campaign before the referendum, with different organizations all confirming that the overall package deal was a
good one even if some elements did not seem ideal.
79. Hungary (March 31, 1994) and Poland (April 5, 1994) had already formally
applied. Other pending applications included Turkey (April 14, 1987), Malta (July 3,
1990), and Cyprus (July 3, 1990). More importantly, it was clear that other CEECs, who
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had to take a position first, whether to plan for accession of the
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and second,
how to integrate countries that were still very different from the
Western European states. In particular, the CEECs did not share
the same post-World War II history, did not have stable and
functioning democracies, had limited experience with market
economy, and even less experience with respect of human rights
and rule of law.80
Prior to Gorbachev’s policy shift in 1986 toward Glasnost
(openness) and Perestroika (restructuring), the EU had very
little contact and experience with the CEECs. The Soviet Union
had created its own integrated market with the Eastern
European satellite states, the COMECON or CMEA.81 The EU
and the CMEA did not have direct relations, only indirectly via
their member governments. Since the CMEA countries were also
not members of the GATT and, therefore, subject to high
import duties and frequent antidumping procedures on their
(industrial) exports to the West, trade between the two blocks
was limited. The motives for Gorbachev’s policy shift will never
be fully clear. Arguably, he just wanted to improve the
efficiencies of the socialist economies to better keep up with the
West, in particular after Reagan accelerated the arms race in
1979 and the Soviet Union fell more and more behind.
However, after a landmark speech by the Soviet leader at the UN

had already achieved or were negotiating association agreements with the EU, were in
the process of preparing formal applications for membership.
80. Specifically with regard to rule of law, see Frank Emmert, Rule of Law in Central
and Eastern Europe, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 551, 553, 578–80 (2009); Zdeněk Kühn,
European Law in the Empires of Mechanical Jurisprudence: The Judicial Application of
European Law in Central and Eastern Europe Candidate Countries, 1 CROATIAN Y.B EUR. L.
& POL’Y 55, 55 (2005). More generally Zdeněk Kühn, World Apart: Western and Central
European Judicial Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 531
(2004); see also SLAVENKA DRAKULI , CAFÉ EUROPA—LIFE AFTER COMMUNISM (1996).
81. This “Council for Mutual Economic Assistance” was actually larger than the
EU at the end of the 1980s. It also included six founding members as of 1949 (Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union) and then grew to
include Albania, East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, and a couple of observers,
with a total of 450 million people on three continents, compared to about 350 million
people in the twelve Western European Member States of the EU. However, as the
CMEA was based on non-market economies, production and prices were centrally
planned, mostly in Moscow, and this created the well-known inefficiencies of the
socialist economies. The CMEA ended in 1991.
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in December 1988,82 Soviet control over the CEECs quickly
disintegrated and the Communist regimes in Poland,83
Hungary,84 East Germany,85 Czechoslovakia,86 Bulgaria,87 and
Romania88 all fell within months of each other in 1989-1990.
82. In this speech he announced a reduction of Soviet troops in the CEECs by
500,000 over the next two years and declared “that force and the threat of force can no
longer be, and should not be instruments of foreign policy.” Insofar, the speech would
still be consistent with the view that he was mainly concerned about losing the arms
race and wanted to focus limited resources more effectively. However, he also
mentioned “[f]reedom of choice” as “a universal principle” in the context of countries
pursuing “both the capitalist and socialist systems.” Intended or not, this was
interpreted as a signal in the CEECs that the Soviet Union would no longer resort to
force to prevent a re-orientation of these societies. Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Gen.
Sec’y, Address at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly Session (Dec. 7, 1988),
available at http://isc.temple.edu/hist249/course/Documents/gorbachev_speech_to_
UN.htm.
83. Round-table negotiations between the communist Government and the
Solidarity trade union began on February 6, 1989 and by August 24, 1989. Tadeusz
Mazowiecki was the first freely elected non-communist prime minister in an Eastern
block country.
84. As of the early summer 1989, Hungary no longer prevented East German
tourists from climbing over the fence of the West German embassy in Budapest to seek
asylum there. This triggered a flood of thousands and later tens of thousands of East
Germans trying to reach West Germany via Hungary and on September 11, 1989,
Hungary simply opened its border to the West. On October 23, 1989, Hungary itself
adopted a new constitution providing for free elections, which were held in May 1990.
85. The situation of the East German regime became completely untenable after
Hungary opened its borders and thousands of East Germans left for West Germany
literally every day as of September 1989. General Secretary Honecker was ousted on
October 18. 1989 and, in an effort to regain control over daily demonstrations, new
“travel regulations” were adopted on November 9, 1989, that the crowds immediately
interpreted to the effect that force would no longer be used at the border of West
Germany. The wall came down that very night, a caretaker government was installed by
early December, and less than a year later, on October 3, 1990, East Germany was no
more.
86. The so-called Velvet Revolution started with student protests on November 17,
1989, which quickly grew into large daily demonstrations in the center of Prague. By
November 24, the communist leadership had resigned and within a month, Alexander
Dubček (speaker of parliament) and Václav Havel (president) took over as elected
leaders. The first free elections were held in June 1990.
87. Inspired by the uprisings in other CEECs, regular demonstrations started in
Bulgaria in November 1989 and by December 11, 1989, the communist government
had to resign. Like in Czechoslovakia, the first free elections were held in June 1990.
88. Romania experienced the highest level of violence in the context of the 1989
uprisings. Large scale demonstrations started on December 16, 1989 in Timişoara and
spread to Bucharest the next day. President Ceauşescu brought in the military to
contain the protests and over 1100 died in street fighting in the following days. This
caused increasing defections in the armed forces and on December 22 the dictator and
his wife were arrested and, after a trial that lasted all of two hours, both were sentenced
to death and immediately executed on December 25, 1989. The revolution in Romania
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Even the once mighty Soviet Union itself ceased to exist at the
end of 1991, triggering the independence of the three Baltic
States and eleven other nations.
As a first step in formalizing totally new relations with the
newly independent CEECs, the EU offered Trade and
Cooperation Agreements on a bilateral basis. EU Commission
President Jacques Delors, still riding a wave of support for the
success of the 1992 Internal Market program, carved out a lead
role for the EU Commission by coordinating the aid from the
Western industrialized countries (G24) to the CEECs. This led
to the establishment of the EU’s PHARE program
(Pologne-Hongrie Assistance à la Restructuration des
Économies)89 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (“EBRD”) in London.90 Although large amounts
was not only much more violent than in the other CEECs, it was also less successful.
After the ouster of Ceauşescu, the “National Salvation Front,” essentially a gathering of
mid-level communist bureaucrats, took over at first provisionally and then managed to
win several elections and dominate Romanian politics for more than a decade.
89. See Council Regulation 3906/89, Economic Aid to the Republic of Hungary
and the Polish People’s Republic, 1989 O.J. L 375/11 (EC). In English, the acronym
PHARE stands for “Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring the Economies;”
it was subsequently expanded to all ten candidate countries. PHARE was amended in
1999, see Council Regulation 1266/1999 on Coordinating Aid to the Applicant
Countries in the Framework of the Pre-accession Strategy and Amending Regulation
(EEC) No 3906/89, 1999 O.J. L 161/68, and supplemented with SAPARD, the Special
Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. See Council Regulation
1268/1999, Community Support for Pre-Accession Measures for Agriculture and Rural
Development in the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the
Pre-Accession Period, 1999 O.J. L 161/87, at 89. Together with SAPARD, the EU added
ISPA, the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession, with a focus on
infrastructure development. See Council Regulation 1267/1999, Establishing an
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession, 1999 O.J. L 161/73. In 2000,
another program was added specifically for the Western Balkans, see Regulation
2666/2000 on Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and
Stabilisation (CARDS), 2000 O.J. L 306/1. All earlier instruments were replaced in
2006 by a unified Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (“IPA”), see Council
Regulation 1085/2006 Establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA),
2006 O.J. L 210/82, and the implementing Commission Regulation 718/2007
Implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 Establishing an Instrument for
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), 2007 O.J. L 170/1. From 2007 to 2014, a total of
EU€11.5 billion were made available for the Western Balkans and Turkey under the
IPA.
90. By being open to membership of the United States, Japan, and others, the
EBRD channeled aid from outside the EU into the CEECs. Nowadays, its mandate is
expanded to include Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. See The History of the
EBRD, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://
www.ebrd.com/pages/about/history.shtml .
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of money and innumerable trips by Western experts were
deployed to support the transition in the CEECs, the results
were a bit mixed.91
From early on this approach established an asymmetrical
relationship, in which the EC set the conditions for
assistance, and ultimately for accession. . . . [The] focus on
assistance [also] revealed a perception of transition as a
predominantly technical problem, solvable through a
transfer of expertise and financial resources.92

Increasingly, the EU came to recognize, however, that forty
and more years of socialism had deformed not only the economies but also the way things were done—or not done—in the
CEECs. Soviet central planning and command economy had
always been unpopular among the majority of politicians and
administrators in the satellite states. With time, they had learned
to meet the targets of the recurrent five year plans without
breaking their backs, i.e. to meet them on paper and not
necessarily in reality.93 This skill came in handy now, as the
CEECs were faced with reform pressure from the EU.

91. For the period 2000 to 2006 alone, the EU budget provided pre-accession
assistance for a total of EU€18.430 billion (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD together). See
EU COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR THE BUDGET, EU BUDGET 2008 FINANCIAL REPORT
82 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2008/
fin_report/fin_report_08_en.pdf. The lion’s share of this went to PHARE.
Nevertheless, an internal review of PHARE done in 2007 concludes that “[on] the
whole, the results and impacts of Phare support were rather mixed . . . . Prospects for
sustainability are also mixed” and “the absence of an overall support strategy turned
Phare into an essentially reactive, activity-focused instrument which did not sufficiently
address the interdependence between the political and economic criteria and the
acquis.” See EU COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GEN. ENLARGEMENT, SUPPORTING
ENLARGEMENT—WHAT DOES EVALUATION SHOW?, at I, II (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/evaluation/
consolidated_summary_report_phare_ex_post_eval.pdf.
92. Ulrich Sedelmeier & Helen Wallace, Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second
Thought?, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 427, 434 (Helen Wallace &
William Wallace eds., 4th ed. 2000). For a critical review of the typical EU expert
training in Central and Eastern Europe in those early years, based on first-hand
experience of the authors, see Frank Emmert, Introducing EU Competition Law and Policy
in Central and Eastern Europe: Requirements in Theory and Problems in Practice, 27 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 642, 671–73 (2004).
93. See, in particular, Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and
Eastern Europe, 9 EURO. L.J. 288 (2003).
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As Brussels came to understand that successful reforms in
the region would be inevitable94 but would also require a
coherent long-term strategy, it began to develop a new policy, a
veritable pre-accession strategy. Thus, as the next step in the
development of closer relations with the CEECs, the EU negotiated a series of association agreements. Although called “Europe
Agreements”95 and thus at least potentially distinct from
“normal” association agreements, they were focused on a
gradual opening of market access for goods and to a lesser
extent the other factors of production (services, establishment,
and capital). Free movement of workers was not provided, only
non-discriminatory treatment of those nationals from the CEECs
who were already lawfully employed in the EU and vice versa.
Like in other association agreements, Association Councils were
created as joint decision-making bodies for certain matters
falling under the Agreements.96 However, the Europe
Agreements were still intentionally vague on the whether and how
of full membership.97 The Gordian knot was cut at the meeting
of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. The
heads of state and government of the twelve decided as follows:
The European Council today agreed that the associated
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall
become members of the European Union. Accession will
take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume
94. Failure in the CEECs was not an option. Unless the West was going to export
stability and progress to the East, the East would start exporting instability and other
problems to the West. To continue on its mission of securing peace and prosperity for
Europe, the EU now had to do so for all of Europe.
95. The Agreement with Poland was approved on December 13, 1993, by the
Council after ratification by the twelve Member States of the EC, the EEC, the ECSC,
and Euratom, as well as Poland. See 1993 O.J. L 348/1. For the agreement with
Hungary, see 1993 O.J. L 347/1; for the agreement with Romania, see 1994 O.J. L
357/1; for Bulgaria, see 1994 O.J. L 358/1; for the Slovak Republic, see 1994 O.J. L
359/1; for the agreement with the Czech Republic, see 1994 O.J. L 360/1; for the
agreement with Latvia, see 1998 O.J. L 26/1; for the agreement with Lithuania, see
1998 O.J. L 51/1; for the agreement with Estonia, see 1998 O.J L 68/1; for the
agreement with Slovenia, see 1999 O.J. L 51/3.
96. For more detailed discussion of the Europe Agreements, see TATHAM, supra
note 2, at 76–82.
97. In the preambles, there was a passage “Recognizing the fact that the final
objective of [the associated country] is to become a member of the Community and
that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective.” See,
e.g., 1993 O.J. L 348/3 (referring to Poland). Beyond that, no promises were made,
however.
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the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic
and political conditions required.
Membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection
of minorities, the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership
presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.
The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an
important consideration in the general interest of both the
Union and the candidate countries.98

Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission developed “The
Europe Agreements and Beyond: a Strategy to Prepare the
Countries of Central Europe for Accession” in July 1994,99 and
then the White Paper on the “Preparation of the Associated
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into
the Internal Market of the Union” in May 1995.100 Next came
the even more comprehensive “Agenda 2000 for a Stronger and
Wider Union” of July 1997101 which addressed the mutual
dependency of widening and deepening. Step by step, this took
accession from a procedure to a fully fledged enlargement policy.
On the inside, the EU had to get ready for the biggest and
most challenging enlargement in its history by making
numerous adjustments to the decision-making procedures.
From the outset, small Member States have been structurally
over-represented in the institutions. For example, until and
98. These are the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria.” See Presidency Conclusions,
Copenhagen European Council 13 (June 21-22, 1993).
99. The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe for Accession, COM (1994) 320 final (July 13, 1994). This
was by and large adopted at the European Council in Essen on December 9–10, 1994.
100. Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for
Integration into the Internal Market of the Union, COM (1995) 163 final (May 3,
1995). For analysis see, for example, Marc-André Gaudissart & Adinda Sinnaeve, The
Role of the White Paper in the Preparation of the Eastern Enlargement, in ENLARGING THE
EUROPEAN UNION: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
41 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1997).
101. E.U. BULL., no. 5 (1997).
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including the EFTA enlargement in 1995, Germany as the
largest Member State had 99 seats in the European Parliament
and 10 votes in qualified majority voting in the Council of
Ministers. By comparison, Luxembourg as the smallest Member
State had 6 seats in the European Parliament and 2 votes in the
Council. Given the fact that the German population of around
82 million is about 200 times larger than Luxembourg’s
population of less than 500,000, per capita, the Luxembourger’s
are about twelve times better represented in the Parliament and
have about 40 times greater voting power in the Council. Given
the very significant difference in population size, there is no easy
solution to this imbalance. For example, if the electoral districts
for the European Parliament were to be of equal size to make
the vote of each European have equal weight, the size would
have to be equal to the smallest Member State. This would give
Luxembourg one single delegate in the European Parliament
while Germany would get to send almost 200. If all German
members of the EP were to vote in the same way - by nationality
rather than political affiliation, which is unlikely but not
impossible - all delegates of all small Member States102 might as
well stay at home because they would collectively number only to
about 180.103 The unequal voting power of the citizens in
different EU Member States has already triggered several
challenges against German allegiance to the EU Treaties before
the German Constitutional Court. In 1995, in an unusual
exercise of self-restraint, the Bundesverfassungsgericht still held
that German standards for equality of the vote could not be

102. For the present purposes, the “small” Member States are those with
populations of around 15 million and less, i.e. the Netherlands (16.5 million), Greece
(11.2 million), Belgium (10.7 million), Portugal (10.6 million), Sweden (9.2 million),
Austria (8.3 million), Denmark (5.5 million), Finland (5.3 million), Ireland (4.5
million), and Luxembourg (0.5 million). Among the 15 Members at the time, only
Spain was medium sized (45.8 million), and the others were large Members, namely
Germany (82 million), France (64.3 million), the United Kingdom (61.7 million), and
Italy (60 million). See EU Member Countries, EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/
member-countries (last visited June 3, 2014).
103. For analysis, see Frank Emmert, Die institutionelle Reform der Europäischen
Union und die künftige Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments, in DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM
IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 63 (J.H.H. Weiler et al. eds., Swiss Papers on European
Integration, 1995).
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applied to the elections to the European Parliament104 and that
the specific nature of the European Union as “a union of
sovereign Member States” could justify a different approach.105
However, the problem with the structural over-representation of the small Member States was going to get much worse
with the Great Eastern Enlargement, since nine of the ten candidates in Central and Eastern Europe and both Mediterranean
islands were going to be small, with only Poland as a medium
sized Member.106 Since the members of the European
Parliament have an independent mandate and are not subject to
instructions from their home countries, the four large old
Member States were much more interested in the dilution of
their voting power in the Council with the addition of all the
new small countries than in their representation in the
European Parliament. This was the most difficult issue to be
resolved in two subsequent treaty reforms. A first but insufficient
step was taken with the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2
October 1997. On the bright side, Amsterdam moved more of
the Council’s decisions into genuine co-decision with the
European Parliament as per Article 294 TFEU. On the dark side,
Amsterdam also effected the first re-numbering of all articles in
104. While Article 38(1) of the German Grundgesetz (Constitution) mandates that
elections for the German Bundestag (Parliament) have to be “general, direct, free,
equal, and secret” (official translation by the Press and Information Office of the
Federal Government, emphasis added), Article 39(2) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the Union requires only “direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot”
without a requirement of strict equality.
105. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 31,
1995, 2 BvR 635/95 (Ger.), as quoted in II THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE CASES 255 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed.,
2003). When the Bundesverfassungsgericht had a chance to rule on Germany’s
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty of December 13, 2007, it abandoned the self-restraint
and complained bitterly that the European system did not follow the German
principles of equal voting power. See BVerfG, June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2
BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, and 2 BvR 182/09. For a very critical
review of the latter decision, see EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR
INTERNAL POLICIES, POLICY DEPARTMENT CITIZEN’S RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, CITIZENS’ WEIGHT OF VOTE IN SELECTED FEDERAL SYSTEMS, PE 453.168 (April
2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/
2011/453168/IPOL-AFCO_ET(2011)453168_EN.pdf
106. Poland (38.1 million), Romania (21.5 million), Czech Republic (10.5
million), Hungary (10 million), Bulgaria (7.6 million), Slovakia (5.4 million),
Lithuania (3.3 million), Latvia (2.3 million), Slovenia (2 million), Estonia (1.3 million),
Cyprus (0.8 million), and Malta (0.4 million). See EU Member Countries, supra note 102.
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the two main Treaties, not exactly helping to bring the EU
closer to the citizens. Since many important questions remained
unresolved, another intergovernmental conference was
launched almost immediately and resulted, on 26 February
2001, in the signing of the Treaty of Nice, which brought the
breakthrough in the voting mechanisms in the Council of
Ministers by adding a population threshold107 and thus ensuring
that many small Member States would never be able to dictate
what a handful of large Member States would have to do—and
pay for.108
On the inside the EU was now ready for the Big Bang or
Great Eastern Enlargement.109 Of course, in parallel to these
107. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 238(2)–(3), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 153–54. For
further analysis, see, for example, Eric Philippart & Monika Sie Dhian Ho, Pedalling
Against the Wind—Strategies to Strengthen the EU’s Capacity to Act in the Context of
Enlargement (WRR Scientific Council for Government Policy, Working Document
W115, The Hague 2001).
108. Seventy-one percent of the EU budget in 2012 came from GNI-based
contributions of the Member States and 10.7% came from VAT-based contributions of
the Member States. In both categories, the large Member States tend to make much
larger contributions than the small Member States. The rest of the budget came from
customs duties (12%) and other own revenue sources of the EU (6.2%). See Financial
Programming and Budget: EU Expenditure and Revenue, EU, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/
figures/interactive/index_en.cfm (last visited June 3, 2014).
109. It would be beyond the scope of the present Article to also discuss in detail
the problems faced by the old Member States with regard to the costs of enlargement,
respectively the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds. In
a nutshell, if the CEECs were to be integrated into the old rules of the CAP, the budget
for agricultural support measures would have to be doubled because of the relatively
large share of the population, in particular in Poland, living off the land, and their
relatively low level of income. Similar problems existed with regard to the structural
funds because very nearly all regions in the new Member States would have qualified
for the highest level of support under the old rules. The resolution in the end took
three elements. First, a new financial framework was agreed at the special European
Council meeting in Berlin in March 1999. Second, it was agreed that the farmers in the
CEECs would not receive fully equivalent levels of subsidies from day one of
membership on the basis of the lower levels of income and prices and thus higher value
of those subsidies in the CEECs. By phasing-in the support payments from a level of
40% of Western subsidies, the cost of the agricultural component of enlargement was
immediately cut in half. See, e.g., W. Münch, Effects of CEEC-EU Accession on Agricultural
Markets in the CEEC and on Government Expenditure, in CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
AGRICULTURE IN AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION 113 (S. Tangermann & M. Banse
eds., 2000). Third, the CEECs were also going to be treated differently with regard to
payments under the structural funds. For the period 2007–2013, the so-called policy of
economic and social cohesion had a budget allocation of some EU€300 billion, the
bulk of which was spent in regions with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the EU
average. Had they been treated equally, Romania, for example, would have been
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efforts at deepening the integration process and streamlining
the decision-making, the efforts at widening, i.e. the
preparations of and negotiations with the candidates, had
continued at full speed. In spite of the somewhat mixed results
of the PHARE and other pre-accession support instruments, the
CEECs had made remarkable progress with regard to the
re-orientation of their economies from East to West. In their
race for opportunities, international and domestic investors
became early movers and essentially treated the CEECs as if they
already enjoyed the political stability and legal certainty that EU
membership was going to provide. On the institutional front,
the CEECs became partners in the Structured Relationship and
the Political Dialogue postulated in the Europe Agreements,
providing for ever more bilateral and multilateral meetings. In
the old Member States, these meetings were able to build a level
of comfort with and trust in the candidates, while the latter were
learning the rules of the games played in the halls of power in
Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, which in turn had an
effect of stabilization and moderation on the governments in
the CEECs.110 Progress was not even across the CEECs, however.
Already in the Agenda 2000, the Commission had emphasized
that each country would be evaluated on its own merits—the
so-called regatta approach—and had proposed that accession
eligible for up to EU€400 per capita or almost EU€9 billion per year. This could have
amounted to as much as 36% of GDP in EU support payments. However, economists
have shown that countries can typically not absorb more than about 4% of GDP in
foreign aid without serious problems of duplication, waste, and corruption. See STUART
CROFT ET AL., THE ENLARGEMENT OF EUROPE 75–77 (1999) (citing K. Hughes,
Managing the Costs of Enlargement: The Structural Funds (presented at the conference
“Enlarging the European Union: The Way Forward,” Birmingham, AL, July, 1–2,
1997)). By capping the structural fund payments at 4% of GDP the cost of this
component of enlargement also became instantly more manageable. In the end,
countries like Romania were not even able to absorb that 4% of GDP—i.e. to propose
and manage deserving projects for the use of the funds. For example, in 2007 Romania
was able to absorb only 21.7% of the reduced funding it would have been eligible for.
This meant, inter alia, that Romania in some years ended up paying more into the EU
budget than it got out of the EU budget. See Iulian Viorel Braşoveanu et al., Structural
and Cohesion Funds: Theoretical and Statistical Aspects in Romania and EU, 11
TRANSYLVANIAN REV. ADMIN. SCI. 30 (2011); Georghe Zaman & George Georgescu,
Structural Fund Absorption: A New Challenge for Romania?, 10 ROMANIAN J. ECON.
FORECASTING, 136.
110. See, e.g., Barbara Lippert, Gaby Umbach & Wolfgang Wessels, Europeanization
of CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power, 8 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y
980 (2001).
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negotiations should first be opened with the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia, while the other
candidates would first have to make more progress in their
economic, legal, and political reforms. To monitor each
country’s progress and to emphasize areas that were not
advancing in a satisfactory manner, the Commission issued
regular Progress Reports for each candidate country. The
screening process determining the status quo of the candidate
countries’ legislative and administrative structures and their
compatibility with the acquis communautaire for the CEECs
started in the summer of 1998 and the first chapters for the
negotiations were opened soon thereafter. From 2000, accession
of a first group by the year 2002 seemed realistic and that group
kept growing, eventually including all candidates except
Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. To facilitate the timetable, the
Commission prepared a roadmap suggesting priorities and
potential obligations that could be subject to transitional
arrangements after accession. The roadmap was endorsed by the
Nice European Council in December 2000 and the goal of
accession before the next European Parliament elections in
June 2004 was set.111 Negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Malta were concluded in December 2002, the
European Parliament gave its assent to the accession treaties on
April 9, 2003, and then the respective treaties went to the 15 EU
Member States and the 10 candidate countries for ratification.
Bulgaria and Romania, however, were given an additional three
years to complete their preparations for membership, and
Turkey was not given any specific dates. As is well known, eight
CEECs and two Mediterranean islands joined the EU on 1 May
2004, bringing the membership of the Union from 15 to 25,
while Bulgaria and Romania finally joined in 2007. Turkey, by
contrast, has been repeatedly sidelined for largely political
reasons and is still on and off in negotiations today.
What this all shows is that to outsiders, whether they are
candidates for accession or countries seeking association or
other bilateral agreements, the EU is “a tough and unyielding
111. For details, see ALLAN F. TATHAM, ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
84–98 (2009).
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partner because 95% of its agenda is immovable.”112 On the one
hand, the EU generally does not re-negotiate the acquis. Any
candidate for membership has to take it over lock stock and
barrel and, at best, can hope to negotiate some transitional
periods. On the other hand, any agreement with the EU
requires unanimity on the side of all existing Member States. De
facto, the candidate has to please everyone and make promises it
may neither be willing nor able to keep. Indeed, Maggie
Thatcher is supposed to have given the following advice to
Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in the 1980s: accession
negotiations consist of “agreeing to a whole lot of things to get
in and then, once in, trying to undo all the amazing things you
agreed to do in the first place.”113 After six rounds of
enlargements and plenty of promises, many kept, some not so
much, it will not surprise anyone that the EU is trying ever
harder to front-load the accession procedure and require and
verify that most of the promises are already delivered before a
country is given the keys to the kingdom and the power to start
undoing.
IV. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH CROATIA
A. Brief History of Croatia’s Negotiations with the EU
Becoming an EU Member State has been the key strategic
goal of Croatia ever since its international recognition as an
independent state after the dismembration of Yugoslavia.
However, domestic and international circumstances, most
notably the 1991-1995 war with Serbia,114 and the composition
112. HEATHER GRABBE, CTR. FOR EUR. REFORM, WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN: THE
NEXT PHASE IN EU-TURKEY RELATIONS 2 (2004), available at http://www.cer.org.uk/
sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_turkey_hg_
nov04-2169.pdf.
113. Susannah Verney, with help from J.I. Torreblanca, dug this up in the
Financial Times of May 9, 1991. See Verney, supra note 58, at 317.
114. Chris Patten, then Commissioner for External Relations, stated on the
occasion of the Commission’s presentation of Croatia’s Avis to the European
Parliament on April 20, 2004: “Had it not been for the legacy of war, [Croatia] might
well have got to this stage on the road to membership much earlier.” Rt. Hon Chris
Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, Commission’s presentation of Croatia's
Avis to the European Parliament, European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg
(Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-185_
en.htm. Anyone wanting to understand the background to the violent dissolution of
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and priorities of several successive Croatian governments, did
not allow the country to be part of the fifth and sixth
enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The EU complained, in
particular, that the Croatian governments and the way they went
about their business, did not provide sufficient guarantees for
democracy, respect of human rights and rule of law, and
effective combat of corruption. The breakthrough occurred
when the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (“SAA”)115
was signed with the EU on October 29, 2001. Croatia was the
second country to sign an SAA with the EU, after Macedonia,
and that agreement represented the first formal contractual step
in institutionalizing the relationship of Croatia with the EU. The
agreement entered into force on February 1, 2005 following the
ratification by the EU Member States, the EU itself, and
Croatia.116
Even before the entry into force of the SAA, Croatia had
applied for full EU membership on February 21, 2003, and the
European Commission issued on April 20, 2004 a positive avis
on the application of Croatia and recommended that
negotiations for accession to the European Union should be
opened. While generally positive, the Commission avis did recall
some remaining legacies of the war with Serbia, in particular
Croatia’s failure to locate and arrest a military leader indicted in
front of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)117:

Yugoslavia should read, in this order, REBECCA WEST, BLACK LAMB AND GREY
FALCON—A JOURNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA (1942); MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF
YUGOSLAVIA—THE THIRD BALKAN WAR (1992); PAUL MOJZES, YUGOSLAVIAN
INFERNO—ETHNORELIGIOUS WARFARE IN THE BALKANS (1994); SABRINA P. RAMET, THE
THREE YUGOSLAVIAS—STATE BUILDING AND LEGITIMATION, 1918-2005 (2006).
115. Stabilization and Association Agreements were used for the Western Balkan
countries instead of the “Europe Agreements” used for the CEECs.
116. Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European
Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Croatia,
of the Other Part, 2005 O.J. L 26/3.
117. The official name is “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.” The tribunal is a specialized court
of the United Nations; its judges have the same status as the judges on the International
Court of Justice. For more information, see About the ICTY, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/
sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
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Croatia is a functioning democracy, with stable institutions
guaranteeing the rule of law. There are no major problems
regarding the respect of fundamental rights. In April 2004,
the ICTY Prosecutor stated that Croatia is now cooperating
fully with ICTY. Croatia needs to maintain full cooperation
and take all necessary steps to ensure that the remaining
indictee is located and transferred to ICTY. Croatia needs to
make additional efforts in the field of minority rights,
refugee returns, judiciary reform, regional co-operation and
the fight against corruption. On this basis, the Commission
confirms that Croatia meets the political criteria set by the
Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the
Stabilisation and Association Process conditionalities
established by the Council in 1997.
Croatia can be regarded as a functioning market economy.
It should be able to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union in the medium term,
provided that it continues implementing its reform
programme to remove remaining weaknesses.
Croatia will be in a position to take on the other obligations
of membership in the medium term, provided that
considerable efforts are made to align its legislation with the
acquis and ensure its implementation and enforcement.
However full compliance with the acquis in the field of
environment could be achieved only in the long term and
would necessitate increased levels of investment.118

These concluding remarks encompass the core elements
which were evaluated regarding the country’s readiness to start
negotiations on accession to the EU. They remain very
important for future applicants, naturally taking into account
different and/or additional elements, depending on the
circumstances of each individual case.119
118. Communication from the Commission, Opinion on Croatia’s Application for
Membership of the European Union, at 120–21, COM (2004) 257 final (Apr. 20, 2004).
119. See Communication from the Commission, Commission Opinion on Montenegro’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (2010) 670 final
(Nov. 9, 2010); Communication from the Commission, Commission Opinion on
Serbia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, at 11-12, COM (2011)
668 final (Oct. 12, 2011). The Opinion on Serbia’s application contains also the
element of its relations with Kosovo. On the other hand, the Opinion on Albania’s
application naturally did not contain the section on cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; see Communication from the
Commission, Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the
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On the basis of the Commission’s Opinion, Croatia was
granted candidate country status by the European Council on
June 18, 2004120 and a date for the beginning of accession negotiations was originally set for March 17, 2005. However, one day
before that date, the EU postponed the commencement of
negotiations because the ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte
had meanwhile assessed the Croatian efforts to capture the
fugitive General Ante Gotovina, the above-mentioned indictee,
as neither timely nor sufficient.121 Eventually, after Croatia was
able to persuade the Chief Prosecutor that it was fully
cooperating and not responsible for the failure to arrest General
Gotovina,122 the negotiations commenced with the first
Intergovernmental Conference on Accession Between Croatia
and the EU on October 3, 2005,123 the same day the EU started
the accession negotiations with Turkey.
For the negotiations with Croatia, the acquis was divided
into 35 chapters,124 four more than the usual 31, since some
European Union, at COM (2010) 680 final (Nov. 9, 2010). Equally, the Opinion on
Iceland’s application was drafted in the same format, reflecting essentially the same
elements but with substantially different wording, which is the consequence of
Iceland’s membership in the European Economic Area and its existing application of
relevant parts of the acquis; see Communication from the Commission, Commission
Opinion on Iceland’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM
(2010) 62 final (Feb. 24, 2010).
120. See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, (June 17–18, 2004),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/81742.pdf.
121. See Rep. of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/60/267 (Aug. 17, 2005).
122. This is a rare but not the only case in which the EU based its decision
regarding the opening of accession negotiations on the opinion of a third party and
not on its own evaluation. One can regard it as an example of the irony of history that
General Gotovina, after having being been arrested on December 7, 2005, in Spain, was
tried before the ICTY for war crimes. His 2011 conviction was eventually overturned by
the ICTY Appeals Chamber on November 16, 2012, and Gotovina was immediately
released. Croatia still lost half a year on its accession negotiations and suffered
considerable international embarrassment. The full judgment in the Gotovina case is
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf.
123. Actually the negotiations started shortly after midnight, i.e. only on October
4, 2005, but since the agenda was adopted on October 3 and the conference started
that day, history would record that October 3, 2005, was the day of the beginning of the
negotiations. The Council decision is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/86442.pdf.
124. 1. Free Movement of Goods; 2 Freedom of Movement for Workers; 3. Right
of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services; 4. Free Movement of Capital; 5.
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parts of European law which had previously been in one chapter
were divided into several chapters. The decision to break up
certain chapters was based on the experience in previous
negotiations where these chapters had proven to be especially
large and troublesome. The so-called screening process began
on October 20, 2005, with the chapter on “Science and
Research.” During this procedure, the Commission, in close
cooperation with the candidate country, essentially compiles the
status quo ante of the candidate country’s legislative, regulatory,
and administrative structures in order to determine the
necessary changes to implement the acquis communautaire and to
ensure the administrative and institutional capacity for its
application. The screening procedure is concluded with a
screening report from the Commission to the Member States
which recommends either that accession negotiations can be
opened, or that they should not be opened until certain benchmarks have been met, or that they should not be opened at all at
the present time.125 In the case of Croatia, the process of
Public Procurement; 6. Company Law; 7. Intellectual Property Law; 8. Competition
Policy; 9. Financial Services; 10. Information Society and Media; 11. Agriculture and
Rural Development; 12. Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy; 13. Fisheries;
14. Transport Policy; 15. Energy; 16. Taxation; 17. Economic and Monetary Policy; 18.
Statistics; 19. Social Policy and Employment; 20. Enterprise and Industrial Policy; 21.
Trans-European Networks; 22. Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural
Instruments; 23. Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; 24. Justice, Freedom and Security;
25. Science and Research; 26. Education and Culture; 27. Environment; 28. Consumer
and Health Protection; 29. Customs Union; 30. External Relations; 31. Foreign,
Security and Defence Policy; 32. Financial Control; 33. Financial and Budgetary
Provisions; 34. Institutions; 35. Other Issues. For more information, see Negotiations
Chapters, DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (June
30, 2011), http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/?lang=en&content=67.
125. For example, in the case of Turkey, on December 11, 2006, the Council
decided that eight chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally
closed until Turkey agrees to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara
Agreement. The Ankara Agreement is the Agreement Establishing an Association
Between the European Economic Community and Turkey signed in Ankara on
September 12, 1962; Commission Regulation 3026/77, Agreement Between the
European Economic Community and Turkey Consequent on the Accession of New
Member States to the Community, 1977 O.J. L 361/1. The Additional Protocol of
November 23, 1970 provides for the transition from the preparatory stage to the
gradual application of the internal market rules and the creation of the customs union
as of January 1, 1996; see 1972 O.J. L 293/3-56. Additionally, in 2007, France decided to
block the opening of five chapters in the negotiations with Turkey and in December
2009, Cyprus announced that it would block the opening of six chapters. For details,
see infra Part V.C.; Turkey-EU Relations, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
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screening national compatibility with the 35 acquis chapters was
completed on October 18, 2006.126 Croatia then presented its
“negotiating positions” for each chapter and the Commission
responded with the negotiating positions of the EU. In the EU
positions, the Commission provided opening benchmarks for
various chapters, i.e. conditions to be met by Croatia before the
negotiations on a particular subject would even be opened.
Opening benchmarks typically include the adoption of certain
laws or policies or the establishment or enhancement of certain
administrative bodies or structures. Once a particular chapter is
opened, the negotiations can take from several weeks127 to many
months or even years and the Commission often develops
closing benchmarks, i.e. conditions to be met before the
negotiations on the subject are declared successfully completed.
Even after chapters are provisionally closed, they can be
re-opened at any time as long as negotiations in other chapters
continue, as the Commission and/or the Member States see fit.
Originally Croatia had aimed to complete the negotiations
in time to be able to accede to the EU in 2007, together with
Romania and Bulgaria. However, the negotiations turned out to
be tougher than expected on various points. To some extent,
Croatia is to blame for this, in particular because of insufficient
administrative capacities, i.e. various state institutions were not
ready and not reacting in due time to various requests of the
EU. Although the Croatian government and the negotiating
team were highly motivated and focused, this was not necessarily
the case for all ministerial and sub-national administrative units.
In a way, the country was mentally not quite ready. These
difficulties and the ensuing lengthy duration of the negotiations
can be connected to the acquis, the sheer quantity and
complexity of the material to be covered. However, the duration
of the negotiations is also to blame on circumstances for which
Croatia is at best partly responsible and even some that have
little or nothing to do with the acquis and the country’s
AFFAIRS,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-europeanunion.en.mfa (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
126. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
127. In the case of Croatia, the negotiations on Chapter 25 Science and Research
and on Chapter 26 Education and Culture were opened and—successfully—closed on
the same day. This is possible if there are no differences in the positions of the EU and
the candidate country, i.e. the candidate accepts the EU position.
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fulfillment of any of the conditions of membership. For
example, the negotiations were blocked for ten months by
Slovenia due to a border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia.
In September 2009, Slovenia removed the restraints on Croatia’s
negotiations with the EU without prejudice to the international
arbitration on the border dispute. Naturally, Slovenia neither
had to justify why it had held up the negotiations nor was there
any form of reprimand or sanction. This is simply part of the
prerogatives of the Member States, those that are in versus those
that are not,128 because the opening and closing of chapters and
even the setting of opening and closing benchmarks requires a
Commission proposal and a unanimous decision by the
Council.129
While a single Member State can hold back a candidate, a
consensus between the Member States and the Commission can
also accelerate the negotiating process with a country, at least
potentially creating exceptions to some of the normal
procedural steps. For example, after Iceland applied for
membership in July 2009 in the wake of its financial meltdown,
several Council members and the Commission publicly
contemplated that the accession negotiations with Iceland could
be fast-tracked to the extent that Croatia and Iceland could join
the European Union together as early as 2011.130

128. The Commission tried but was unable to persuade Slovenia to give up its
blockade. Only after a number of Member States intervened, was it possible to resolve
the issue and move on with the negotiations.
129. By contrast, suspension of negotiations for a serious and persistent breach of
the values on which the Union is based, can be proposed by the Commission but also
by a third of the Member States, and can be decided by qualified majority vote in the
Council. Thus, suspension has a lower threshold.
130. Ollie Rehn, at the time the EU Commissioner in charge of Enlargement, told
journalists on January 29, 2009, that “[t]he EU prefers two countries joining at the
same time rather than individually. If Iceland applies shortly and the negotiations are
rapid, Croatia and Iceland could join the EU in parallel.” The reason for this view was
not just that joint accession is making the institutional adjustments a bit easier for the
EU, otherwise the same logic should have worked for Bulgaria and Romania in 2004
and for Turkey in 2013. However, Iceland was welcome as “one of the oldest
democracies in the world and [having a] strategic and economic position [that] would
be an asset to the EU.” See Ian Traynor & Valur Gunnarsson, Iceland to be Fast-Tracked
into the EU, GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/
30/iceland-join-eu. In short, many things are possible if they are in the interest of the
EU and none of the Member States object.
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Croatia ultimately finished its accession negotiations on
June 30, 2011 and the Treaty of Accession was signed in Brussels
on December 9, 2011.131 Croatia held a national referendum on
accession on January 22, 2012 where 66.25% voted in favor, and
33.13% against. The whole ratification process in Croatia was
completed on April 4, 2012. Some of the Member States took
considerably longer. Therefore, Croatia became the
twenty-eighth Member State of the EU only on July 1, 2013,
following the ratification of the Accession Treaty by all 27
Member States.
B. What Really Are Negotiations on Accession?
As one can read in any textbook on the EU, accession negotiations are the process by which a candidate country accedes to
the European Union and adopts the whole body of European
law, the famous acquis communautaire. As mentioned above, the
main elements of the continuously evolving and expanding
acquis are the treaties as primary legislation, the regulations,
directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions as
secondary legislation, as well as other sources of law, in
particular the decisions of the European Court of Justice,
certain general principles of law, international agreements
involving the EU, and other acts (resolutions, declarations,
recommendations, guidelines, joint actions, joint positions,
etc.). Although the EU has gone through 660 simplification
initiatives and has repealed almost 6000 legal acts since 2006,
the overall volume of the acquis has recently been estimated to
have grown to some 160,000 pages. In addition to the sheer
quantity, the biggest challenge with the adoption of the acquis by
a negotiating country, which was also the case with Croatia, is
that the acquis does not stop evolving and expanding. Rather, it
is constantly being amended and supplemented from the
131. To be precise, the Council called on the Commission to complete the negotiations on June 24, 2011, the negotiations were completed with the closing of all
chapters on June 30, 2011, and the Commission issued its positive avis on October 12.
See Commission Opinion on the Application for Accession to the European Union by the Republic
of Croatia, at 3, COM (2011) 667 final (Oct. 12, 2011). The European Parliament voted
its assent on December 1, 2011, the Council unanimously approved the status of
Croatia as an acceding country on December 5, 2011, and the Accession Treaty was
signed on December 9, 2011.
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moment the negotiations with a candidate country begin, all the
way until that country joins and beyond. Thus, a negotiating
country is supposed to harmonize its legislation with a moving
target. In some cases that is extremely difficult, especially if the
deadline for the transposition of a particular legal instrument—usually a directive—into the national legislation of the
Member States is after the date when a negotiating country is
expected to have its legislation harmonized with the acquis in
that subject area. In such a case, if a candidate country is asked
to transpose a directive into its legislation before the Member
States have to do the same, the candidate country is faced with
the clear goal but without tools and direction how to proceed.132
It is then crucial that the members of the negotiating team and
the state administration of the negotiating country are inventive
and understand the expectations of the Commission. It becomes
almost like schoolwork, when a negotiating country drafts provisions on amending a particular legal act, taking into account
the directive which is to be transposed, submits the draft to the
Commission and awaits whether it will get a failing or a passing
grade. If the grade is positive, the negotiating team and its
government then have to proceed with the even harder task of
persuading the national parliament that the legislation has to be
adopted literally in the wording as agreed, without any changes
that could jeopardize the Commission’s consent. Finally,
following adoption of the national law, the negotiating team still
has to prove to the Commission that the legislation is actually
and completely and correctly implemented in practice, although
this may not at all be the case in at least some of the Member
States.133 The negotiating country is consequently required to
132. On one occasion, a Commission representative said to the members of the
Croatian negotiating team, “We are guests in a restaurant, you are chefs, so make us
something nice and tasty. It is up to you to choose what and how to prepare the meal.”
133. Christophe Hillion spelled out the phenomenon that “the EU demands on
candidates are different from the ones they face once they are accepted as members”
and called it “double-standards (‘do as I say, not as I do’) that have . . . undermined the
credibility of the Union’s commitments to the norms and values it [advocates] vis-à-vis
the applicants.” See CHRISTOPHE HILLION, THE CREEPING NATIONALISATION OF THE EU
ENLARGEMENT POLICY 15–16 (Swedish Inst. for European Policy Studies, Report No. 6,
Nov. 2010). One of the troublesome consequences is a compliance drop in at least
some countries after accession and, as a reaction, calls for special post-accession
monitoring because the normal instruments of the Commission and the European
Court of Justice for ensuring Member State compliance with all elements of the acquis
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submit evidence that the national legislation is fully harmonized
with the acquis and completely and correctly applied before
accession, even when that accession to the EU is still remote
and—because of political reasons and the requirement of a
referendum—basically uncertain.
Participants in the negotiating process are the candidate
country on one side and the EU Member States on the other. In
the course of the negotiations, the negotiating positions of the
EU are represented by the Presidency of the Council of the
European Union, on behalf of the Member States, while
negotiations are conducted on behalf of the candidate country
by the State Delegation for Negotiations. Negotiations are
conducted
within
the
framework
of
a
bilateral
Intergovernmental Conference held by representatives of the
EU Member States on one side and representatives of the
candidate country on the other.
Technically, however, the negotiations are substantially
between the negotiating team of the candidate country and the
representatives of the European Commission which negotiates
under the mandate given to it by the European Council. In that
are not always fast and effective, to say it politely. The compliance drop—while widely
acknowledged—is neither automatic nor found across all countries, as Epstein and
Sedelmeier have shown. See INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE BEYOND CONDITIONALITY:
POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPE AFTER EU ENLARGEMENT (Rachel Epstein & Ulrich
Sedelmeier eds., 2013).
The suggestion that the requirements for candidate countries are tougher than for
Member States is disputed by Giedr Vinikien Stonyte, Head of EU Law
Implementation Division at the European Law Department of the Lithuanian Ministry
of Justice. According to Ms. Vinikien , the Member States have to adopt their
implementing acts for EU Directives without much or any guidance by the EU. As a
result, the Commission often demands changes in the language of the implementing
act, if it considers that the implementation is not sufficiently precise. This causes major
problems when the implementation was done in the form of legislation by the national
parliament. In theory, since the Member States participated in the adoption of the EU
Directive itself, they should be perfectly aware how it has to be understood and
implemented at home. In practice, according to Ms. Vinikien , the majority of EU
Member States still have not figured out how to link the decision-making process at the
EU level with the decision-making process at the national level in such a way that
congruence is always assured. Another problem noted by Ms. Vinikien is the fact that
the Commission liberally sets deadlines for Member State authorities to respond and
act while the Commission itself is not subject to any deadlines whatsoever. In sum, Ms.
Vinikien suggests that the candidate countries should look at the accession
negotiations as a kind of pre-school for the life as a Member State because things are
not getting any easier any time soon (communication on file with authors).
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sense, the Commission has a crucial and pivotal role in the negotiating process on the legal and technical level. In this respect,
the speed and ultimately the fairness of the negotiations largely
depends on the preparedness, general and inter-personal
qualifications, and the substantive knowledge and experience of
the individual representatives of the Commission and the
members of the negotiating team of the candidate country, and
their ability to understand the context and logic of the acquis
and the reasons behind occasional hold-ups.
The negotiating structure for the accession of the Republic
of Croatia to the European Union was established by decision of
the Government of the Republic of Croatia of April 7, 2005. This
Decision set down the composition of the bodies that formed
the structure for the negotiations and assigned the role of
competent bodies of individual negotiating chapters to state
administrative bodies and other bodies or institutions. In the
Croatian negotiating process the following bodies were
established: the State Delegation of the Republic of Croatia for
Negotiations on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the
European Union (essentially a political body led by the minister
responsible for European integration), the Coordinating
Committee for the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the
European Union (an inter-ministerial body consisting of the
ministers or their plenipotentiaries responsible for the issues
which were negotiated within particular negotiating chapters),
the Negotiating Team for the Accession of the Republic of
Croatia to the European Union, numerous Working Groups for
the Preparation of Negotiations on Individual Chapters of the
acquis communautaire, the Office of the Chief Negotiator, and the
Secretariat of the Negotiating Team. The members of the bodies
of the negotiating structure were also appointed by the Decision
of the Government.
The Negotiating team consisted of the chief negotiator and
fifteen members. Most of them remained as members of the
negotiating team throughout the entire negotiating process and
only a few of them were exchanged, in particular because some
initial members took up functions incompatible with their membership of the negotiating team (e.g. one became a minister,
another became a judge of the constitutional court). Each
member of the negotiating team was responsible for several
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negotiating chapters and his/her task was to coordinate the
work among the working groups for those chapters and to be
responsible to the government for the progress of the
negotiations in those chapters. The negotiating team had
regular meetings, at least once a month and more often when
necessary, in total almost 100 formal meetings.
The ‘immediate’ work in every chapter was conducted by
the Working Groups for the Preparation of Negotiations on
Individual Chapters. Thus, there were 35 working groups lead by
the heads of the working groups. Membership in the working
groups depended on the structure and content of an individual
chapter. Generally, a typical working group—if there was such a
thing—would consist of 20-40 persons. However, in some
working groups, e.g. for agriculture, several hundred people
were involved. In total, more than 1500 members were included
in the work of the working groups, mostly high-ranking officials
of the state administration, up to the level of deputy ministers,
but also representatives of non-governmental organizations,
professional chambers, trade unions, associations of
entrepreneurs, and the academic community.
Since domestic political support for the negotiations and
the many changes to the national laws and institutions is critical
for success, the members of the negotiating team also have to be
part of an information and public relations campaign at home.
In this regard, it is important to note that the members of the
negotiating team and the heads of the working groups were not
all members of the state administration. This peculiarity of the
Croatian negotiating process proved to be more burdensome
and difficult at the beginning of the negotiations but eventually
more productive and efficient. Those participants in the
negotiating process who were not members of the state
administration found it initially more difficult to penetrate the
often slow, inert, and quiescent state administrative structure
(including but not limited to questions like “Who are you” and
“What do you want?”). Nevertheless, their primary advantage
was that they were not part of and therefore not burdened by
the administrative hierarchy and consequently were more
independent in presenting their views to the public, which many
times were not necessarily in line with the views of the
governmental bodies. For this kind of structure to work it was
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indispensable that all members of the team, even at times when
they did not agree with certain points of the official strategy,
enjoyed the full and not only declaratory support of the state
government. Since every single member of the negotiating team
and every head of a working group had been hand-picked and
agreed by all major parliamentary parties in the process of their
appointment, they were fully trusted and supported not only by
the government but also by the main parties in opposition. This
turned out to be an essential element for the success of the
whole negotiating process.
In accordance with the Parliamentary Declaration on the
Principles of the Negotiations, the Parliament was also involved
in the negotiation procedure in all its stages and not only at the
time of the ratification of the Accession Treaty. For that
purpose, a National Committee was established as a
parliamentary working body with the task of following the
negotiations. While membership of the National Committee
reflected primarily the political parties represented in the
Parliament, it also included representatives of the associations of
entrepreneurs, trade unions, universities and the Office of the
President of Croatia. The president of the National Committee
was always a member of the opposition. Over the years, it was
interesting to observe that the voting in the National Committee
on most issues was unanimous, irrespective of otherwise fierce
political fights among the political parties in the government
and in the opposition.
Accession negotiations are not considered to be
negotiations in the classical sense, but a process of
harmonization on the part of the candidate country to the
values and to the legal, economic and social system of the
European Union. The candidate country does not negotiate the
acquis communautaire itself, but rather the conditions and ways
for its own legislation to be harmonized with the acquis and the
means for its implementation. The negotiations are focused not
only on the harmonization of the legislation of a candidate
country with the acquis communautaire but also, and even more
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importantly, with its administrative and judicial capacity for the
effective implementation of the acquis.134
As mentioned above, negotiations in every chapter are
initiated by screening, which is the analytical overview and
evaluation of the degree of harmonization of national legislation
with the acquis communautaire. The main purpose of the
screening process is to determine the differences that exist
between the national legislation and the acquis, and the changes
that will be necessary before the national legislation can be said
to be fully harmonized with every chapter of the acquis and thus
ready for accession. On the basis of the analysis, the candidate
country is required to state whether it will be able to fully
harmonize national legislation and institutions with the acquis by
the anticipated date of accession, which is of course not known
at the time of screening, or whether the candidate country
expects to need transitional periods after accession.
Depending on the results of the screening, i.e. the
readiness of the candidate country to apply the acquis, the EU
Member States decide on the opening of negotiations in
individual chapters. While this is formally a decision of the
Council of the EU, the proposal to open the negotiations or to
request further assurances from the negotiating country before
opening the negotiations in an individual chapter is made by the
Commission. With the opening of negotiations for individual
chapters, the substantive phase of the negotiations begins.
Negotiations are conducted on the basis of the negotiating
position of the European Union—referred to as the “common
position”—and the position of the candidate country, which are
prepared for each negotiating chapter after the screening
results.
If there is a view that a candidate country still has to fulfil
certain conditions before the negotiations in a particular
chapter may be opened, i.e. if the country is not sufficiently
prepared to start the negotiations immediately following the
screening, the Commission sets the benchmarks to be met by
the candidate country before negotiations will be opened.
Benchmarks were introduced by the Commission’s 2006
134. On this subject, see Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central
and Eastern Europe, 9 EUR. L.J. 288 (2003); TATHAM, supra note 2, at 355–97.
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Enlargement Strategy and defined as “a new tool introduced as
a result of lessons learnt from the fifth enlargement.”135 Their
purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by
providing incentives for the candidate countries to undertake
necessary reforms at an early stage. Benchmarks are measurable
and linked to key elements of the acquis chapter.”136
Besides the opening benchmarks, which have to be met
before opening the negotiations in a particular chapter, the EU
may, in its common position, also table closing benchmarks that
have to be met before a chapter will be (provisionally) closed. As
stated explicitly in the 2006 Enlargement Strategy, if a candidate
country no longer fulfils the opening benchmarks in a chapter
that is under negotiation, the Commission may propose that
negotiations be suspended on that chapter. Likewise, if a candidate country no longer fulfils the closing benchmarks in a
chapter that has been provisionally closed, the Commission may
propose to the Member States that accession negotiations on
that chapter be re-opened.
In the course of the negotiations, Croatia had to fulfill 23
opening benchmarks set in 11 negotiating chapters, while negotiations in 22 chapters were opened without benchmarks.137 In
two chapters, “Institutions” and “Other Issues”, there were no
negotiations with the candidate country. Croatia was also given a
total of 104 closing benchmarks across 31 chapters. The number
of opening benchmarks in individual chapters was from 1 to 4
(in Chapters 8. Competition Policy, and 12. Food Safety,
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy) and of closing benchmarks
from 1 to 10, with the highest numbers in Chapter 23. Judiciary
and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24. Justice, Freedom and
Security. That was not surprising since Chapters 23 and 24 cover
the political criteria for EU membership and fulfillment of the
conditions therein should ensure that a candidate country will,
135. 2006 Enlargement Strategy, supra note 6, at 6. Kochenov argues that the
conditions of “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy” and “rule of law” as part of
the Copenhagen Criteria were ultimately too vague and impossible to measure during
the negotiations with the CEECs prior to the big bang enlargements of 2004 and 2007.
See DIMITRY KOCHENOV, EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF CONDITIONALITY:
PRE-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY IN THE FIELDS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2008).
136. 2006 Enlargement Strategy, supra note 6, at 6
137. A list of all chapters is included in supra note 124.
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as a Member State, contribute to the development of the Union
as an area of freedom, security and justice. These matters are
also horizontally affecting all other chapters because the
judiciary and justice system has to ensure the application of the
acquis while also securing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as equality before the law. The establishment of an independent and efficient judiciary is of paramount importance, and impartiality, integrity and a high
standard of adjudication by the courts are essential for
safeguarding the rule of law. In addition, a candidate country
must submit evidence that a functioning system for the fight
against corruption is in place. That is in line with the political
“Copenhagen criterium” requiring “stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities.” It is essential for the
candidate country to provide evidence that the democratic
system and the rule of law are fully functioning, meaning that
the principles are actually implemented in practice.138
If one were to ask which are the most difficult chapters to
negotiate, one should not only take into account the number of
opening or closing benchmarks. It is also necessary to evaluate
what the benchmarks are. They may be the adoption of an
action plan or strategy, the enactment of a legislative measure,
the establishment of an agency, institution or other state
administrative or judicial body, or the providing of a track
record of implementation of the acquis. For a negotiating
country, it may be relatively easy or very difficult to meet a
particular benchmark. However, the question of whether a
benchmark is more or less difficult to meet also depends on the
question of how the Commission will determine whether it has
been accomplished.
Naturally, the difficulty of complying with a particular
chapter of the acquis is primarily determined by internal factors
in the negotiating country. Harmonization with EU law
138. In the case of Croatia, an important piece of evidence demanded by the EU
Commission to show that the required conditions were fully met was the arrest of and
commencement of criminal proceedings against the former prime minister on several
charges related to corruption and abuse of official position. This was the same prime
minister who was in office at the beginning and throughout most of the duration of the
Croatian negotiations with the EU.
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sometimes requires the repeal of measures protecting the state’s
nationals and discriminating against nationals of other EU
member states, notably undertakings. The more a candidate
country protects certain markets, the more difficult the
negotiations in that area will be. In Croatia this was true, for
example, regarding the chapters on Agriculture and Rural
Development, as well as Competition Policy. Another problem
area concerned the chapter on Fisheries, which for obvious
reasons will be of no concern for Macedonia or Serbia. In
addition, a chapter may be perceived as difficult if it requires
changes that impose substantial financial burdens on the
negotiating country or its citizens or undertakings as
harmonization with EU law may demand the introduction of
new rules and practices that have not been employed previously.
Such chapters are for example those on Environment and
Energy.
After agreement has been reached between the EU and the
candidate country on a particular chapter of the negotiations,
and once any and all benchmarks have been met, the respective
chapter is considered provisionally closed. While this indicates
satisfactory progress in the respective area, a chapter may be reopened as long as the negotiations on other chapters are continuing, if the negotiating country does not honor the obligations undertaken during the negotiations. Only when the
negotiations for all chapters of the acquis are at least
provisionally closed, will the results of the negotiations be
incorporated into the provisions of a draft of the Accession
Treaty, i.e. an international agreement between the EU (its
institutions and Member States) and the candidate country.
Once the details and language of the Accession Treaty have
been agreed and the Treaty has been signed, the candidate
country is regarded as an acceding country pending all required
ratifications.
When a former negotiating country becomes an acceding
country, its obligations may be equally burdensome as during
the negotiations. While there are no benchmarks to be met, an
acceding country actually has to behave as if it already was a
Member State, as regards its obligations to comply with the ever
evolving acquis that is being adopted after the signing of the
accession treaty. However, while the acceding country has all the
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obligations under the new EU laws, it has none of the rights,
neither when it comes to participating in the negotiations that
led to the adoption of the new laws, nor when it comes to their
enforcement against the EU institutions and/or the Member
States. This dichotomy between rights and obligations in the
acceding period can be very frustrating. The point can be illustrated as follows: Although the Croatian Treaty on Accession
does not foresee any specific type of post-accession monitoring –
formally called “Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification” –
as exist for Bulgaria and Romania,139 the Treaty provides that the
Commission shall closely monitor all commitments undertaken
by Croatia in the accession negotiations, including those which
must be achieved before or by the date of accession, and that in the
autumn of 2011, the Commission shall present a Progress
Report to the European Parliament and the Council, and that in
the autumn of 2012, it shall present a Comprehensive
Monitoring Report to the European Parliament and the
Council. The monitoring was to focus in particular on
commitments undertaken by Croatia in the area of the judiciary
and fundamental rights, including the continued development
of track records on judicial reform and efficiency, impartial
handling of war crimes cases, and the fight against corruption.
The Commission’s monitoring was to focus also on the area of
freedom, security and justice, as well as on commitments in the
area of competition policy. The Commission was to issue

139. See Protocol Concerning the Conditions and Arrangements for Admission of
the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, art. 36–39, 2005 O.J. L
157/29, 40–41; see also Commission Decision 2006/928 of 13 December 2006,
Establishing a Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification of Progress in Romania to
Address Specific Benchmarks in the Areas of Judicial Reform and Fight Against
Corruption, 2006 O.J. L 354/56; Commission Decision 2006/929 of 13 December 2006,
Establishing a Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification of Progress in Bulgaria to
Address Specific Benchmarks in the Areas of Judicial Reform and the Fight Against
Corruption and Organised Crime, 2006 O.J. L 354/58. The mechanism is still in place
and the Commission continues to report “under the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism every 6 months on progress with judicial reform, the fight against
corruption and, concerning Bulgaria, the fight against organised crime.” See European
Commission, Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification for Bulgaria and Romania: The
reports on progress for Bulgaria and Romania, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm#thirteen. The most recent set of
reports was approved by the Commission on January 22, 2014.
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six-monthly assessments up to the accession of Croatia on the
commitments undertaken by Croatia in these areas.140
Consequently, after the Accession Treaty was signed and
before Croatia became a member, there were three monitoring
reports, in April 2012, October 2012 and March 2013.141 The
first two stated that Croatia was generally on track with its
preparations for EU membership, nevertheless the Commission
identified a limited number of issues requiring further efforts.
This wording was the reason why several Member States waited
for the final monitoring report and expected it to be unequivocally positive as to Croatia’s success in completing the remaining
work before it would be considered fully ready for EU membership. Indeed, the March 2013 report did state that the Commission was confident that Croatia would be ready for membership
on July 1, 2013, removing the final obstacle.
V. LESSONS FOR ONGOING AND FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH MONTENEGRO AND OTHER CANDIDATES
A. General Remarks
Croatia is the only country to have successfully completed
accession negotiations with the EU under the new 2006
Enlargement Strategy. Negotiations with Turkey started on the
same day as with Croatia, but in the meantime they have been
going at a very slow pace. This is partly due to the recent cooling
in the relationship between the EU and Turkey but more
substantially due to the never ending debate within the EU
concerning whether Turkey should become a Member State in
the first place.142 After rather expedient initial negotiation
process, Iceland decided to dissolve the negotiating team and no
to proceed with the negotiations, unless and until so approved
140. See Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Republic of Croatia,
2012 O.J. L 112, 21, 31.
141. See Communication from the Commission, Monitoring Report on Croatia’s
Accession Preparations, COM (2012) 186 final (Apr. 24, 2012); Communication from
the Commission, Main Findings of the Comprehensive Report on Croatia’s State of
Preparedness for EU Membership, COM (2012) 601 final (Oct. 10, 2012); Communication from the Commission, Monitoring Report on Croatia’s Accession Preparations,
COM (2013) 171 final (Mar. 26, 2013)
142. For further discussion see infra, Part V.C.
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via a referendum. This has not taken place as yet.143
Consequently, following the big bang enlargements of 2004 and
2007, to which the 2006 Enlargement Strategy did not apply,
conclusions and predictions on future enlargements processes
may be drawn primarily from the Croatian experience.
At the same time, the negotiating framework for the
countries next in line, most likely Montenegro and Serbia, are
already different from the negotiating framework applied for
Croatia and thus, even the Croatian experience can be used as a
model only to a limited extent. In addition, it seems fair to say
that the negotiating experience of the Member States that took
part in the fifth and sixth enlargements can definitely not be
referred to as the standard that would be followed in future
negotiations on enlargement. It is true, the basic criteria for
membership embodied in Article 49 of the TEU and the
Copenhagen Criteria as reinforced and/or amended by the
conclusions of the 1995 Madrid Council remain the same.
Notwithstanding that, countries referred to by the EU as the
Western Balkans and approved as (potential) candidates for
membership, were given additional criteria arising out of the
stabilization and association process, in particular concerning
regional cooperation and good neighborly relations.144 Beyond
that, countries who were part of the former Yugoslavia were
given the supplementary condition of full cooperation with the
ICTY.
B. “Benchmarks” as the Key Word of the Negotiating Process
The key word to be accentuated from the experience of the
Croatian negotiations is “benchmarks”, i.e. detailed conditions
for specific chapters of the acquis. The Croatian experience
shows that benchmarks are an excellent instrument, in
143. The most current evaluation of the status of the Icelandic accession
negotiations was presented on February 18, 2014, by the Institute of Economic Studies
at the University of Iceland in a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A summary in
English is available at http://www.mfa.is/news-and-publications/nr/7960.
144. Regional and cross-border cooperation with neighboring countries was
mentioned in such explicit terms for the first time in the conclusions of the 1999
Helsinski European Council. See Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council
(Dec. 10–11, 1999). Turning “good neighbourly relations” into explicit conditions for
membership for the countries of the Western Balkans is a response to the problems
experienced in the breakup of Yugoslavia.
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principle, both for the EU and for the negotiating country, but
they do need some adjustment and fine tuning.
Since they are conditions to be met before starting or
closing negotiations in a particular chapter, the purpose of
benchmarks is to evaluate whether the negotiating country is
sufficiently prepared—“willing and able”—to apply the acquis
completely, correctly, and effectively and become a Member
State of the EU. The wording of the 2006 Enlargement Strategy,
referring to lessons learnt from previous enlargements, makes it
clear that the primary idea of benchmarks is to communicate
that promises are not sufficient and that the EU needs to see
actual compliance with the acquis to conclude that a country is
properly prepared to function as a Member State.135 As the
terms suggest, however, there should be a difference between
opening and closing benchmarks, i.e. the determination which
benchmarks should logically be imposed at what stage of the
negotiating process. Meeting the closing benchmarks should
ensure that at a time close to accession, a negotiating country is
definitely prepared for membership. The same level of
preparedness would not seem necessary for the mere opening of
the negotiations in a chapter, which typically happens years
before accession. Yet, in practice, this does not mean that
opening benchmarks are necessarily less stringent and less
closely monitored by the EU than closing benchmarks. The
Commission justifies this with the goal of using benchmarks to
provide “incentives for the candidate countries to undertake
necessary reforms at an early stage.”146 While this can be useful
for reforms that objectively serve the candidate country regardless of subsequent accession, it is not always clear that the
Commission, to say it diplomatically, is willing and able to make
a case why some reforms should come before others and why
and how the ones it demands early on are objectively benefitting
the candidate country. For future negotiations, this will be one
of the challenges for the candidate country negotiating teams,
to make their case why some reforms should not be conditioned
at an early stage.147
145. See 2006 Enlargement Strategy, supra note 6, at 6.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Whether this can ultimately be successful remains to be seen. There are good
reasons—some of which have been pointed out in the present Article—why Ellison
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One of the basic innovations in the approach to
benchmarks introduced after the end of negotiations with
Croatia is the general introduction of opening benchmarks for
Chapter 23 Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, as well as
Chapter 24 Justice, Freedom and Security. Before the EU will
open negotiations with any candidate country in these areas, it
now requires the adoption of action plans on bringing the
national structures fully in line with the acquis, with clear time
frames and deadlines, authorities responsible for the
implementation, reliable estimation of the costs and financial
sources for covering the costs, and a measurable result. Action
plans are expected to be precise, realistic and progress is being
monitored by the Commission with the help of “interim
benchmarks” and, where necessary, “updated benchmarks”
which may require new and amended action plans.148 The
reason behind this decision is the importance of those areas for
the functioning of the EU, the same reason that in the case of
Croatia made the negotiations most complex exactly in those
chapters. Without doubt, this new approach of the EU is a result
of the lessons learnt during the Croatian negotiations.
Benchmarks should be clear, effective, logical and measureable and not go beyond what is reasonably possible to achieve
and should not be used as a method of political pressure by
individual Member States in bilateral relations with the negotiating country. Benchmarks should not go beyond what is
expected from the Member States themselves. Of course, what is
expected by the acquis from the Member States is by no means
characterizes the accession negotiations as “an intense struggle to preserve and
safeguard the interests of the old member states” resulting in “a string of dramatic
concessions on the part of the new members” because of structural “bargaining
asymmetries.” “Bluntly put, the ability of the old member states to design and manage
the process of EU enlargement has led to a less than ideal outcome for the new
members.” See David L. Ellison, Divide and Conquer: The European Union Enlargement’s
Successful Conclusion?, 8 INT’L STUD. REV. 150, 151 (2006).
148. See Council of the European Union, Ministerial Meeting Opening the Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union:
General EU Position, Mar. 29, 2012, paras. 21–23, 2012 (8339/12). Interim
benchmarks of December 12, 2013, for Chapter 23 can be found at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=AD%
2017%202013%20INIT. The corresponding interim benchmarks of December 17,
2013, for Chapter 24 are found at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=
EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=AD%2018%202013%20REV%201.
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always in line with the actual practice in the Member States, but
this discrepancy is supposed to be remedied by the EU
instruments and institutions themselves. At the very least,
however, Member States should not impose benchmarks on
candidates which are even at face value going beyond the
obligations of their own. The imposition of such double
standards is not only a violation of the principle of sovereign
equality of nations. It causes considerable frustration in the
candidate countries and influences public opinion towards an
unfavorable view of the EU accession negotiations. Ultimately, it
damages the credibility of the entire negotiating process, makes
reforms in the candidate country and the final ratification of the
accession treaty unpredictable and more difficult. The EU
should not forget that at the other side of the negotiating table
is not some unaccountable bureaucracy but the representatives
of the citizens of the candidate country and these citizens can
hardly be expected to support the importation of European
values if they feel that they are being harassed with benchmarks
that are inappropriately sequenced, unproductive, or even
completely irrational.149
The same critique applies not only to the benchmarks
themselves but also to the method of evaluation of their fulfillment. The benchmarks should be drafted in a manner which
makes it objectively possible to determine whether they have
been met. This is particularly important for the requirement
that action plans have to be adopted and implemented, for
example to improve the administrative and judicial capacities of
the candidate country. If the benchmarks are formulated in a
way that leaves plenty of room for purely discretionary or
arbitrary appraisals, this makes it difficult for the candidate
country to have a clear picture what is expected from it, which in
turn can only slow down and damage the pace of reform.
Moreover, unclear benchmarks provide room for abuse as tools
for exerting pressure on the negotiating country for purposes
which have nothing to do with the benchmark itself, which may

149. See Christophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement
Policy (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps), 2010:6), available at
http://www.wider-europe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/events/SIEPS%20repor
t.pdf.
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of course be the very point of formulating the benchmarks in an
unclear way in the first place.
Benchmarks should also not be used to experiment
whether a particular legal instrument may work in practice. To
be very clear, benchmarks should not be construed to turn the
candidate country into a guinea pig. On the contrary,
benchmarks have to be the logical consequence of the
experience with application of the acquis in the Member States.
Well designed and persuasive benchmarks can be a
powerful tool for reform, not only serving the negotiating
country to fulfill the criteria for membership, but helping it in
making its economy and government more efficient, more just,
and more transparent, or in other ways improve the lives of its
citizens. In short, they can support the development of a better
state and a better society regardless of the perspective of
accession. To that end, benchmarks may internally be used to
put pressure on the parliament and the administration to make
indispensable but politically controversial or painful reforms. Of
course, the line between benchmarks that are unpopular
because they are painful but good medicine and those that are
unpopular because they are inappropriate, unproductive or
irrational is not always easy to draw. Although candidate
countries cannot re-negotiate the acquis itself, the substance and
the sequencing of the benchmarks should be subject of real
negotiations. And given the unequal bargaining power in these
negotiations, one could very well argue that in extreme cases the
candidate countries should be able to call on the European
Court of Justice to review whether a particular requirement is
indeed justified or not.
In the end, the negotiating process itself, including the
development of benchmarks and the assessment whether they
have been duly met, is rather technical. On the other hand, the
opening and closing of chapters and the initial and final
decisions on acceptance of a candidate country are highly
political decisions. The purpose of the benchmarks is to make
the entire process more predictable and to provide for more
thorough analysis and preparation. By and large, the procedure
developed since 2006 is successfully promoting this goal.
However, there is certainly still room for improvement.
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C. Some Remarks and Recommendations for Iceland, Montenegro,
Turkey and Other Actual and Potential Candidates
As we have shown, each enlargement of the EU has added
complexity for subsequent candidates. On the one hand, the EU
has learned from bad experience with criteria that were met
only on paper and promises that were not kept after accession
and increasingly insists that candidates have to meet all
conditions of membership before the negotiations will even be
completed. On the other hand, since each candidate has to get
an affirmative vote from each existing Member State, each
additional country in the club is another opportunity for
bilateral score settling and political posturing.
One of the conditions for accession – at least in theory – is
the settlement of any disputes with third countries, including
border disputes.150 Consequently, France did not agree to
opening the accession negotiations with Cyprus until the
territorial conflict with Turkey would be settled. At some point,
the EU essentially told the Greek and Turkish communities in
Cyprus to do whatever it would take to end the territorial
division of the island and that the EU would pay for any
reasonable solution. However, the Greek Cypriots had a
champion on the inside and were thus immune to any real
threats regarding the delay or denial of accession. In 1998, the
Greek Government in Athens made it abundantly clear that it
would block any enlargement unless Cyprus was going to be part
of the package. Later Greece again used its leverage as an
insider to ensure the conclusion of the negotiations with Cyprus
in exchange for accepting Turkey as a candidate country.151
Another example is the blockade by Italy of the opening of
association negotiations with Slovenia from 1994 to 1995. The
background were claims by ethnic Italians to land in the Istria
150. See EU Commission, Agenda 2000 for a Stronger and Wider Union, E.U.
BULL., no. 5, at 51 (1997) (“Enlargement should not mean importing border conflicts.
. . . The Commission considers that, before accession, applicants should make every
effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute among themselves or involving third
countries. Failing this they should agree that the disputes be referred to the
International Court of Justice.”).
151. See Arjan Uilenreef, Bilateral Barriers or Good Neighbourliness? The Role of
Bilateral Disputes in the EU Enlargement Process 10–11 (Clingendael Working Paper, June
2010).
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peninsula, partly in Slovenia, partly in Croatia. The Italians had
been displaced at the end of World War II and various claims
between Italy and Yugoslavia had been settled in a series of
treaties between 1947 and 1988. However, at the time when
Slovenia was supposed to open negotiations with the other
CEECs for association with the EU, the neo-fascist party was part
of the ruling coalition in Italy and under Gianfranco Fini
decided to use its leverage to force Slovenia to recognize the
rights of the displaced Italians or rather their descendants.152
The third example is a dispute between Slovenia and
Croatia over the border demarcation in the Bay of Piran. After
the breakup of Yugoslavia, the two countries initially agreed to
maintain the existing borders. However, about a year after
independence, Slovenia started claiming the entire Bay of Piran
and some land along the Dragonja River that had been part of
the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia. The issue seemed settled in
July 2001 when the Slovenian and Croatian prime ministers,
Janez Drnovšek and Iviča Račan reached a compromise solution
and concluded the Drnovšek-Račan Agreement. However,
Croatia failed to ratify the agreement and the issue remained
contentious until 2007 when both sides agreed to submit the
matter to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. By
now, of course, Slovenia was a member of the EU while Croatia
was hoping to conclude its accession negotiations. Although
Slovenia had agreed not to use membership negotiations to
settle bilateral scores, it blocked the opening and closing of
further chapters in the negotiations with Croatia from
December 2008 to September 2009 and to some extent into
2010.153
Our fourth example is the famous dispute between Greece
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) over
the name of that country. When Macedonia gained
152. At a party rally in October 1994, Fini said that “those who knock on Europe’s
door must make a gesture of repentance.” See Andrew Geddes & Andrew Taylor, Those
Who Knock on Europe’s Door Must Repent? Bilateral Border Disputes and EU Enlargement 8–9,
(Freie Universität Berlin, KFG Working Paper No. 54, November 2013).
153. In January 2009, some political forces in Slovenia unsuccessfully tried to
gather enough signatures to force a referendum on Croatia’s accession to NATO. See
Geddes & Taylor, supra note 152, at 10–12; Uilenreef, supra note 151, at 15–22; Matej
Avbelj & Jernej Letnar Černič, The Conundrum of the Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia—The
Case of Maritime Delimitation, 5 J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 6 (2007).
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independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, it adopted a constitution
pursuant to which the official name would be “Republic of
Macedonia.” Ever since, it has been accused by Greece of
violating international law and good neighborly relations
because the name Macedonia is claimed exclusively by Greece
for its northern province. De facto, Greece has been blocking
Macedonia’s accession to NATO and the opening of accession
negotiations with the EU since 1995.154 Some elements of the
story have “overtones of a Marx Bros film,”155 for example when
it came to finding a seat for Macedonia in the General Assembly
of the UN. Greece rejected seating the country under “M”,
while Macedonia rejected “F” for FYROM. The compromise was
a seat under “T” for “The Former Republic.”156
More of these kind of disputes can safely be expected because there are numerous unresolved issues of border delimitation and/or settlement of claims remaining from the breakup
of Yugoslavia.157 And should we ever run out of those, there is
always the question of Cyprus or one of the other EU Member
States blocking Turkey’s accession for good or not so good
reasons.
However, there is considerable fatigue on behalf of some
Member State governments and, in particular, on behalf of the
Commission, with these bilateral issues, which are in essence
abusing the accession process to settle old scores between
neighbors. Indeed, at the end of the negotiations with Croatia, a
proposal was briefly fielded to include in the Accession Treaty
with Croatia a clause that would prohibit the country from
blocking subsequent enlargements – Serbia being the elephant
154. Of course, the Macedonian government in Skopje is not exactly helping its
cause by keeping a document on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which
claims that there are 750,000 Macedonians living in Bulgaria and another 700,000 in
Greece, thus implicitly making territorial claims to the homelands of these compatriots.
See Appetite for EU Enlargement Hits All Time Low, EURACTIV (Oct. 17, 2013, 9:03 AM),
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-appetite-enlargements-hits-ti-news-531142.
It may also be safely assumed that Macedonia, by keeping the official name as “Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia FYROM”—instead of changing it to something
permanent like “Utopia”—is holding open the door to going back to just “Macedonia”
as soon as the accession to the EU is accomplished and Greece does not hold the same
leverage over the issue.
155. Geddes & Taylor, supra note 152, at 13.
156. Id.
157. See Geddes & Taylor, supra note 152; Uilenreef, supra note 151.
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in the room – due to unresolved bilateral issues. However, the
idea was quickly dropped after Croatia committed via a
statement at the intergovernmental conference not to block
anyone for unresolved bilateral issues.158 We can only speculate
that the Member States were happy to get rid of the idea
because each of them ultimately likes the power it can wield via
the unanimity requirement and would not want to see the
process move into a direction of majority voting or at least a
situation where the majority could decide whether opposition
from a single country was well founded or not.159
As long as the unanimity requirement remains, every actual
or potential candidate must know that every round of enlargements also enlarges the pool of countries that will have to agree
to any subsequent accessions and thus will have to be pleased by
the later applicants. This alone should be the most powerful
argument against the UK exit from the EU: Should the UK
indeed get out and then change its mind at a later time, it will
have to run the gauntlet and unless there was some miraculous
change in the relative desirability of British membership, it will
certainly not be able to maintain its famous Thatcher discount
on membership fees and various other privileges. Similarly,
Serbia is sure to face some headwind simply because a number
of countries that it waged war on in the context of the breakup
of Yugoslavia made it into the EU before. Last but not least, the
Swiss vote against continuation of the bilateral agreement on
free movement of persons on February 9, 2014 is virtually
certain to come back to haunt the country, not only if one day it
158. In response, the Croatian parliament adopted a Declaration on October 21,
2011, pursuant to which “Croatia firmly believes that outstanding issues between states
which are of a bilateral nature, such as border issues, must not obstruct the accession of
candidate countries to the European Union from the beginning of the accession
process until the entry into effect of the Accession Treaty.” Declaration on the Promotion
of European Values in Southeast Europe, Official Journal of the Republic of Croatia, No.
121 of 21 October 2011, available at: http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=
47289&sec=765.
159. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the Croatian government will
remember this declaration—or whether it can be held to it, for example by a candidate
country—now that Croatia has moved from out to in, and thus from the receiving end
of bilateral grief to, at least potentially, the giving end. Arguably, Croatia should not be
bound if the other Member States, such as Greece or Cyprus, continue their bilateral
blockades. After all, Greece also once promised not to use or abuse its membership to
block the application of Turkey, something it prefers to forget today; see supra note 63.

2014]

EU ENLARGEMENT

1413

decides to revive its application for membership but also
because any new bilateral agreements also require unanimity on
the side of the EU members and a country that is deemed to be
a difficult and unreliable partner will not be a priority for
flexible negotiations on the side of the EU.
In addition to bilateral score settling and a certain level of
enlargement fatigue on the side of the Member State
governments, there are increasing concerns about resentments
against specific countries and/or general enlargement fatigue
among the people in the Member States. For example, in a recent
survey conducted by the Österreichische Gesellschaft für
Europapolitik (ÖGfE), only 24% of Austrians wanted further
enlargement of the EU and only Iceland, the very country that
put its negotiations on hold of its own motion, was considered a
desirable new member.160 Similar results can be found
EU-wide.161 Of course, the opinion of the public has often been
somewhat ambivalent in matters of European integration and
one could be tempted to ignore it in the good old tradition of
the intergovernmental conferences for amendment of the
founding treaties.162 However, the need or the temptation of
160. Austrian Society for European Policy, survey results published on October 16,
2013: support for accession of Iceland (55%), Macedonia (28%), Montenegro (26%),
Bosnia and Herzegovina (26%), Serbia (24%), Albania (20%), Kosovo (19%), Turkey
(15%). See ÖGfE Survey: Austrians Don’t See EU Enlargement as a Priority—Closer
Cooperation Between the EU Countries Is a Priority, ÖGFE [AUSTRIAN SOCIETY FOR
EUROPEAN POLITICS] (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.oegfe.at/cms/index.php?id=63&L=
0&tx_ttnews[backPid]=113&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=647&cHash=23ad61132a.
161. Eurobarometer has been tracking EU citizens’ attitude towards enlargement
for many years. One recent report showed general support for enlargement still above
50% in 2007 and opposition below 40%. However, since then the numbers are rather
the other way around, with about 50% opposing further enlargement in 2011 and only
40% supporting it. A closer look reveals that the attitude differs notably, depending on
the candidate country. While Norway and Switzerland had still almost 80% support
rates in 2010, and Iceland was not far behind with some 75%, the actual and potential
candidates in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans all had below 50% support and
Turkey was trailing with a mere 30% across all EU Member States. See Danilo Di Mauro
& Marta Fraile, Who Wants More? Attitudes Towards EU Enlargement in Time of Crisis,
EUDO SPOTLIGHT 1, 3 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO/
Documents/2012/Spotlight4.pdf; see also supra note 4.
162. Indeed, the only time the EU tried a more open process of treaty
amendment, namely with the Convention on the Future of Europe, which brought
together representatives not only from Member State governments but also from
opposition political parties, as well as a multitude of civil society organizations, under
the chairmanship of former French President Giscard d’Estaing, to write a Constitution
for the EU, the process still failed and the Constitution was rejected by referendum in
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certain Member State governments to put certain questions of
European importance to national referenda presents a point of
caution. Populist politicians in Austria have long threatened to
hold a referendum before signing an accession agreement with
Turkey and with opinion polls reporting up to 80% of Austrians
opposed to Turkey as a Member State,163 it will take something
close to a miracle for Turkey to pass the additional hurdle.164 Of
course, Austria might yet be persuaded that there is something
fundamentally wrong with the population of one Member State
arrogating for itself the power to decide the fate of another
would be Member State, in particular if that country objectively
meets all proper membership criteria. However, others have
toyed with the same idea. The Dutch were contemplating for a
while to hold a referendum and the matter is probably not yet
off the table since it takes only 40,000 signatures in a citizen’s
initiative to force the second chamber of the Dutch parliament
to deal with an issue.165 France went even further and
introduced in 2005 a constitutional amendment that would have
mandated a referendum over any new accessions to the EU.166
France and in the Netherlands. See generally JO SHAW ET AL., THE CONVENTION ON THE
FUTURE OF EUROPE: WORKING TOWARDS AN EU CONSTITUTION, (2007); CLIVE H.
CHURCH, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (2006).
163. See Austria Signals Referendum on Turkey’s EU Accession, EURACTIV (Aug. 25,
2008, 12:55 PM) http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/austria-signals-referendumturkey-eu-accession/article-174868.
164. The Negotiating Framework for Turkey adopted by the EU Member States
anyways includes a number of unusual passages almost as if it wanted to prepare Turkey
for a negative outcome of the accession negotiations. See Christophe Hillion, Negotiating
Turkey’s Membership to the European Union: Can the Member States Do As They Please?, 3
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 269 (2007); see also HARUN ARIKAN, TURKEY AND THE EU: AN
AWKWARD CANDIDATE FOR EU MEMBERSHIP? (2d ed. 2006); Ebru Ş. Canan-Sokullu,
Turcoscepticism and Threat Perception: European Public and Elite Opinion on Turkey’s
Protracted EU Membership, 16 S. EUR. SOC’Y. & POL 483, (2011); Paul Kubicek, Turkish
Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities, 168 WORLD AFF. 67 (2005);
Verney, supra note 58 .
165. See The Netherlands: Petition for a Referendum on the EU, PRESSEUROP.EU (Jan. 28
2013),
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/3329741-petition-referendum-eu. At a certain point, a constitutional amendment was pending in the Netherlands that would have required a qualified majority vote in parliament not only for
substantive EU Treaty amendments but also for the ratification of accession treaties. See
Kamerstukken TK, 2006-2007, 30 874, Nos. 1-3. The latter is not as dangerous as a
referendum but still an elevated hurdle which could be abused.
166. See Article 88-5, introduced by President Chirac on 1 May 2005, pursuant to
which “Tout projet de loi autorisant la ratification d’un traité relatif à l´adhésion d´un
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Fortunately, this requirement was dropped in 2008, not least
because it had caused considerable irritation in Franco-Turkish
relations.167
In effect, holding a referendum in an old Member State
about the accession of a new Member State is not only wrong in
principle, it holds the enlargement process hostage to the
political mood in that particular country at the respective time.
Especially in countries that—unlike Switzerland—do not have a
habit of regular consultation of the citizens via referendum,
there is always a risk that the vote of the people will have more
to do with the current economic situation in that country, the
satisfaction of the electorate with the current government,
and/or a current mood or perception on issues such as
immigration, globalization, and the like.168 An example on point
was provided when Estonia prepared for its referendum on
joining the EU. During the negotiations for membership of the
CEECs, Eurostat and other polling organizations provided
regular reports how the citizens would vote on their country’s
Etat à l´Union européenne est soumis au référendum par le Président de la
République.” (“Any government bill authorizing the ratification of a treaty pertaining
to the accession of a state to the European Union shall be submitted to referendum by
the President of the Republic.”).
167. See France Scraps Referendum on Turkey’s EU Bid, EURACTIV.COM (June 25,
2008, 8:45 AM), http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/france-scraps-referendumturkeys-news-220068. To achieve this goal, a second paragraph has been added to
Article 88-5: “Toutefois, par le vote d’une motion adoptée en termes identiques par
chacque assemblée à la majorité des trois cinquièmes, le Parlement peut autoriser
l´adoption du projet de loi selon la procédure prévue au troisième alinéa de l´article
89.” (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, by passing a motion adopted in identical terms
in each House by a three-fifths majority, Parliament may authorize the passing of the
bill according to the procedure provided for in paragraph three of article 89.”).
President Sarkoszy originally wanted to scrap Article 88-5 entirely to avoid problems for
Turkish accession to the EU. However, this effort failed. With the 2008 amendment,
there is now a choice between the referendum and the vote in both houses of
parliament. Whether it will make a difference in practice remains to be seen because,
at least at the present time, a majority of French delegates is opposed to Turkish
accession so that a three-fifths majority in both houses seems almost as remote as a
majority of the popular vote. Furthermore, President Hollande seems to have a
preference for the referendum, as indicated at a press conference in Ankara on
January 27, 2014. See Turkey’s EU Bid Will Go to Referendum: Hollande, LOCAL: FRANCE’S
NEWS IN ENGLISH (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://www.thelocal.fr/20140127/turkeywants-french-support-for-its-eu-bid.
168. For an analysis of twenty-five referenda on matters associated with EU
membership between 1972 and 2000, see Patricia Roberts-Thomson, EU Treaty
Referendums and the European Union, 24 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 105 (2001).
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accession. These polls showed a very high initial level of support
in most of the CEECs, up to 80% and beyond, in particular in
Poland and Lithuania. Estonia, however, enjoyed an early
Wirtschaftswunder at the time and the national mood was more in
line with the slogan, “we just got out of one union, why join
another in a hurry?” Consequently, the polls showed only about
1/3 of the Estonian voters in support of EU membership, with
another 1/3 against and 1/3 undecided. These poll results held
steady over many months as the date of the referendum came
closer, in spite of ever greater efforts by the EU and the Estonian
government at informing the citizens about the many benefits of
membership. In fact, it sometimes seemed that the information
campaign was almost counterproductive, with the voters
suggesting that if their politicians wanted the EU so badly, it had
more to do with lucrative positions for them in Brussels than
with actual benefits for the average person in Estonia. At one
point, we were joking with Kristiina Ojuland, at the time the
Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of the accession
negotiations, that the most persuasive argument to convince the
Estonians to support EU membership might be the proposal
that otherwise Latvia might come in first. One of the most
important factors changing the mood “for Europe” was the
victory of the Estonian team in the Eurovision Song Contest in
2001 and the subsequent hosting of the event in Tallinn in 2002
and another stellar performance by the singer competing for
Estonia.169 Lukewarm support turned into a solid majority and
the Estonians voted on September 14, 2003 with 66.9% for
membership in the EU.170
If a generational question can be decisively influenced by a
pop contest, the entire idea of direct democracy on matters of
great complexity and potentially permanent consequences
ought to be re-considered! The very reduction of complex
questions that may require nuance and compromise to yes-or-no
alternatives really only works for populist politicians, the great

169. The fact that singer Anna Cecilia Sahlin was actually Swedish did not dampen
the enthusiasm of Estonian TV viewers.
170. The outcome of all referenda held in the big bang countries is reported in
Strategy Paper and Report fot [sic] the European Commission on the Progress Towards Accession
by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, at 22 COM (2003) 676 final.
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simplifiers.171 Thus, the cure for the malaise of our democracies
should not simply be more democracy and certainly not a
dumbing down of democracy.172 At the purely internal national
level, arguably, those who go after more direct democracy will
have only themselves to blame if some decisions turn out to be
less than wise.173 At the European level, however, if one country
votes on the future of another country, it can inflict long-term
damages with impunity.174 This simply can’t be right.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of
government except all the others that have been tried.”
–Winston Churchill
“Europe is not about material results,
it is about spirit.
Europe is a state of mind.”
–Jacques Delors175
Indeed, Europe – the EU as we know it – is a state of mind,
a matter of faith, not of science. In that, it is a bit like
democracy, imperfect in so many ways, yet still better than all
171. In this we disagree with General Colin Powell who said that “Great leaders
are almost always great simplifiers, who can cut through argument, debate, and doubt
to offer a solution everybody can understand.” He may have said this when he was still
supporting President George W. Bush. He might not want to repeat it today. For us,
great leaders are those who can inspire trust and confidence so that they don’t have to
simplify everything beyond recognition but can take care of government in all its
complexity while enjoying broad support of the electorate.
172. For further background reading, see Russell J. Dalton et al., Public Opinion
and Direct Democracy, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 141 (2011).
173. Switzerland is again a case on point, having excluded itself time and again
from more meaningful participation at the European level. In particular, the outcome
of the referendum of February 9, 2014 is widely considered a disaster by the Swiss
business sector. See Michael Rasch, Wirtschaft fordert grosszügigere Umsetzung [Responses to
immigration initiative: Business Calls for More Generous Implementation], NEUE ZÜRCHER
ZEITUNG (Feb. 10, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/wirtschafts-undfinanzportal/zurueckhaltende-reaktionen-aus-der-wirtschaft-1.18239972.
174. One may wonder, for example, what the British would say if their potential
vote in 2017 whether to remain or exit from the EU was subject to a German
referendum whether or not they would be allowed to go.
175. As quoted in TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 504
(2006).
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the alternatives. Eurosceptics have often said that yes, of course,
they are in favor of Europe, just not this one.176 As if we were
standing in a well-stocked supermarket in front of a shelf full of
cereals and we could simply pick “the other one” if we get tired
of the old brand. But we don’t. Just ask any of those
Eurosceptics to come up with an alternative model that would a)
avoid the real and the alleged pitfalls of the current model, b)
still provide the benefits of securing peace and prosperity
among its members and for its neighbors for longer than ever
before in the history of Europe, and c) be more popular or at
least more acceptable to 28 Member State governments, and
their 500 million people, and the multitude of public and
private corporations and associations that define our economies
and societies. We would quickly see that it is a lot easier to
criticize than to create, to destroy than to build.177
The fact that European integration as it stands is a hard
fought and hard won compromise, decades in the making, is
driven home by the subject of enlargement. Although the very
rudimentary rules in the Treaties have been fleshed out with
176. This message is heard almost everywhere and anytime the citizens of the
Member States are polled or voting on matters related to the EU. See, e.g., Henry
Milner, “YES to the Europe I want; NO to This One.” Some Reflections on France’s Rejection of
the EU Constitution, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 258 (2006).
177. Those who try to offer an alternative model, like the CHARTER OF PRINCIPLES
FOR ANOTHER EUROPE, available at http://www.europe4all.org/english/download/
CHARTER_english.pdf, use a lot of beautiful words like “peace” and “freedom” and
“justice” but they do not demonstrate that they have a comprehensive, workable, and
above all widely acceptable model. This Charter, for example, includes the cute idea of
“citizenship based on place of residence,” which would surely trigger a veritable
avalanche of anti-foreign and anti-immigrant euroscepticism. As Reid summarized:
If a camel is a horse designed by a committee, as the old joke goes, then the
ridiculously complicated structure of European Union councils, commissions,
courts, committees, and Parliament scattered around various European cities
makes up a huge camel of a government – an awkward and ugly beast that
somehow manages to perform its necessary functions in a difficult environment. Nobody would have deliberately designed a government as complex
and as redundant as the EU. Rather, the union’s unwieldy architecture simply
evolved, the product of decades of treaties and agreements involving
hundreds of compromises along the way. As Robert Schuman predicted in his
May 9, 1950, declaration, the New Europe was created not according to some
grand overall plan but rather piece by piece, as necessity and experience
suggested.
T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE: THE NEW SUPERPOWER AND THE END OF
AMERICAN SUPREMACY 272 (2004). Those who claim that they can do better than that
have yet to deliver.
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additional criteria and conditions over time, the entire process
continues to be a political process, an art, not a science.
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